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Abstract 
This paper analyses the second decision of the Court of Appeal in Lange v 
Atkinson. The Court of Appeal confirmed that there was a special subset of 
qualified privilege set aside for political speech. This paper also outlines the pre-
Lange law, the decision in the High Court, the first Court of Appeal decision, the 
Privy Council decision and the decision of the House of Lords in Reynolds v 
Times Newspapers. It suggests that New Zealand was not justified in departing 
from the House of Lord's decision and criticises the Court of Appeal ' s decisions 
for not giving adequate reference to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1992. 
It discusses how other jurisdictions have dealt with political speech and compares 
the balance struck between free speech and reputation of each of them to New 
Zealand. It is suggested that New Zealand favours free speech more than 
Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada. 
It then discusses the likely impact of the decision on the media. It is suggested 
that the new decision will lead to a de facto code of ethics which will be 
developed by the judiciary. This is because the Court of Appeal has expanded 
section 19 of the Defamation Act in a way which will now focus more on the 
defendant's conduct. 
The paper discusses whether New Zealand is currently providing adequate 
protection for reputation. It is suggested that while the second Court of Appeal 
decision has greatly improved the balance between protection of reputation and 
freedom of expression, certain problems associated with the burden of proof mean 
that reputation is still not being adequately protected. The Court of Appeal hinted 
at how these problems might be fixed and it is suggested that the Court's 
comments be adopted . The Law Commission ' s commentary in this area is also 
discussed. 
It then discusses the scope of the new privilege. Qualified privilege will now be 
more readily available to those who make statements which concern the 
functioning of representative and responsible government. This test is content-
based and it is suggested that the scope of the new privilege should be defined in . 
relation to the statement-maker' s status. The new privilege affords political" 
speech more protection than other speech. The sorts of anomalies that can arise 
when types of speech are categorised are illustrated . 
The paper concludes by reflecting on the number of issues that still remain in 
relation to this area of law and it is suggested that it may have been easier to 
simply follow the approach taken by the House of Lords in Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and annexures) 
comprises approximately 14593 words. 
I- INTRODUCTION 
In October 1995 North & South magazine published a column, written by 
Auckland University political scientist Joe Atkinson, which heavily criticised 
former Prime Minister the Right Honourable David Lange. Lange sued for 
defamation. After nearly five years of legal analysis, and four judgments, all Joe 
Atkinson knows is that he might have a qualified privilege defence of political 
discussion while all that David Lange knows is that he could defeat such a defence 
by proving that the article was written irresponsibly. This is the result of the latest 
Court of Appeal decision in the Lange v Atkinson saga. 1 While Lange and 
Atkinson are finally able to proceed with the actual defamation suit, practitioners 
and commentators are left pondering the impact of this decision . Although not 
considered by the Court of Appeal to be a major revision of its earlier decision 
(Lange 1998),2 the new judgment (Lange 2000)3 represents a significant shift, 
from both Lange 1998 and the pre-Lange law, in the balance between the 
competing rights of free speech and reputation 
I believe that Lange 1998 greatly advanced qualified privilege, and therefore free 
speech, at the cost of reputation . Other commentators have also criticised Lange 
1998 for this reason. 4 Lange 2000, on the whole, greatly rectifies this imbalance 
by increasing the protection afforded reputation . While the defence of qualified 
privilege for political discussion remains largely intact, the Court of Appeal has 
created a new, enlarged interpretation of malice. 5 The extension moves away 
from the subjective mental state of the defendant and instead focuses on their 
1 [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) [Lange 1997): [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA) [Lange 1998]: [2000] 
NZLR 257 (PC) [Lange 2000-PCJ ; CA 52/97, 21 June 2000 [Lange 2000] . 
2 Lange 1998, above n 1. 
3 Lange 2000, above n 1. 
4 
See New Zealand Law Commission Defaming Politicians: A Response to Lange v Atkinson 
NZLC PP 33 (Wellington. September 1998) [·'NZLC Preliminary Paper"]: B Atkin "Has Lange 
Tipped the Balance too FarT (1998) NZLJ 293 ["'Has Lange Tipped the Balance too Far?"]. 
See also J Burrows "Defamation and Politicians" (1999) Tort Law Review 8: W Rogers 
"Privilege and the Media" ( 1999) Tort Law Review 13 . 
5 
Qualified privilege, once arisen, can be defeated if the defendant was predominately motivated 
by ill will or otherwise took improper advantage of the occasion- s 19 of the Defamation Act 
1992. 
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conduct. A defendant must now act "responsibly" in order to rely on qualified 
privilege. 
This paper discusses the Lange saga and its implications. I conclude that Lange 
2000 represents a major change to the Jaw of defamation, not only in what it 
means for parliamentarians but also in its impact on the development of qualified 
privilege generally. The Court of Appeal has given a green light to discussion 
which "directly concerns the functioning of representative and responsible 
government"6 effectively inviting lower courts to rapidly advance the defence. 
While Lange 2000 is an improvement on Lange 1998 in terms of protecting 
reputation, it raises more questions than it answers. This paper examines some of 
those questions. It must be asked whether the Court of Appeal was justified in 
leaving so many unanswered questions . A recognised aim of the Defamation Act 
1992 is to ensure the prompt commencement and disposal of defamation causes 
of action. 7 This proposition is further reinforced when it is considered that legal 
aid is not available for defamation actions and therefore few can even afford to 
risk taking a claim. Is it fair on plaintiffs to answer one question while raising a 
plethora of others? The Law Commission certainly does not think so .
8 
Part II explains the pre-Lange law and outlines the decisions, from the High Court 
up to the Privy Council. The House of Lords decision in Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers Ltcf (Reynolds) is also discussed. 
Part III focuses on the Lange 2000 judgment and asks whether the Court of 
Appeal was justified in adopting a different approach to the House of Lords. LO 
The Privy Council asked the Court of Appeal to reconsider its decision in light of 
Reynolds.LI In order for the Court of Appeal to justifiably take an alternative 
6 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 10. 
7 Gillespie v McKay (1999) 13 PRNZ 90, 93 (HC). 
8 See New Zealand Law Commission Defaming Politicians: A Response to Lange v Atkinson 
NZLC Report 64 (Wellington. August 2000) ["NZLC Final Report"]. 
9 [1999] 4 ALL ER 609 (HL) [Reynolds HL]. 
10 Reynolds HL , above n 9. 
11 Lange 2000-PC, above n 1, 26-l. 
6 
approach to Reynolds it had to explain the extent to which New Zealand is 
different from the United Kingdom. This part of Lange 2000 is criticised and it is 
suggested that New Zealand is not justifiably different. The absence of Bill of 
Rights analysis in both of the Court of Appeal ' s judgments is also discussed . Part 
r III concludes by discussing the extent to which Lange 2000 advances the pre-
Lange law. I believe that the Lange saga has resulted in a major change. 
Part IV examines the impacts and implications of Lange 2000. The balance New 
Zealand strikes between freedom of expression and protection of reputation is 
compared to other jurisdictions. Australia, Canada, United States and the United 
Kingdom are all examined. The impact on the media is also discussed. In New 
Zealand, while the media will benefit from the new privilege, they will have to act 
"responsibly" in order to enjoy it. The introduction of the responsibility standard 
will mean increased judicial focus on aspects of media behaviour. As it is the 
judiciary and juries who will decide what is responsible and what is not, journalists 
are likely to find themselves subject to judicial standards of journalism. Various 
sources, ranging from internal industry standards to foreign jurisprudence, of 
behavioural restraints are examined to establish the sorts of conduct standards 
that will potentially be necessary in order to enjoy the new privilege. 
Procedural and pleading issues are examined in order to establish whether 
reputation is being adequately protected. Under Lange 2000 qualified privilege 
for political discussion will now arise more easily and it will be up to the plaintiff 
to show that the defendant should not be entitled to the privilege. Procedural and 
pleading restrictions appear to make it very difficult for a plaintiff to defeat the 
privilege. The Court of Appeal intimated how these problems might be fixed , 
however their discussion of the problems was minimal. The Court's suggestions 
are discussed along with other options. Solutions are suggested. 
Part V discusses the scope of the new privilege. The precise rule arising from 
Lange 2000 relates to parliamentarians. This is a status-based rule. The general 
proposition from Lange 2000, being statements about the functioning of 
7 
representative and responsible government, 
12 is a content-based rule . United 
States Jaw is traversed in order to assess the merits of content versus status based 
approaches. The validity of distinguishing political speech from other types of 
speech is also questioned. The sorts of anomalies that can arise when types of 
speech are categorised are illustrated. 
Part VI concludes by reflecting on the number of difficult legal issues that still 
need to be resolved in this area of law. It seems a huge amount of legal argument 
and expense is still needed before the issues surrounding political discussion are 
resolved. Many of these issues could have been avoided if the Court of Appeal 
had followed the approach preferred by the Privy Council and simply allowed the 
existing common law to deal with political discussion. 
13 
II- THE LANGE SAGA 
This part introduces the law of qualified privilege generally and then outlines the 
reasoning that led firstly the High Court and, then on appeal, the Court of Appeal 
to extend the defence. The analysis will be undertaken in light of the balance 
which defamation law seeks to achieve between the competing rights of free 
speech and reputation . I submit that the pre-Lange qualified privilege law did not 
adequately protect free speech. The High Court ' s, and Court of Appeal's (Lange 
1998), reasons for extending this protection are then examined. I suggest that 
these decisions went too far in trying to fix the problem and extended the privilege 
at the cost of reputation . The scales were tipped too far in favour of free speech. 
From this background information it will be possible to examine whether Lange 
2000 restores the balance. 
12 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 10. 
13 This is the approach taken by the House of Lords. see Reynolds Ill, above n 9. 
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A Common Law Qualified Privilege Pre-Lange 
All occasions of qualified privilege are derived either from statute14 or from the 
common law. The defence allows people to speak freely without fear of a 
defamation suit. It recognises, and attempts to mitigate, the "chilling effect" of 
defamation. The chilling effect suggests that free speech is hindered by the law of 
defamation because people refrain from speaking through fear of a defamation 
suit. This theory was recently explored by Eric Barendt, Laurence Lustgarten, 
Kenneth Norrie and Hugh Stephenson.15 After collecting and analysing empirical 
evidence the authors concluded that "the chilling effect genuinely does exist and 
significantly restricts what the public is able to read and hear" . 16 
Common law qualified privilege is based around the familiar duty/interest test as 
described by Lord Atkinson in Adam v Ward: 17 
A privileged occasion is . . . an occasion where the person who makes a 
communication has an interest or a duty, legal. social or moral, to make it to the 
person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is made has a 
corresponding interest or duty to receive it. 
The test is a flexible one designed to be applied in varying fact scenarios. It is 
important to note that strict reciprocity of duty or interest between the maker and 
receiver of a statement is not necessary. 18 It is enough that communication is 
"fairly made by a person . . . in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his 
interest is concerned and demands no community, reciprocity or correspondency 
either of interest or duty" . 19 
In deciding whether the duty/interest test is satisfied, courts consider the width of 
dissemination. The wider the publication the less likely the necessary duty and 
14 Defamation Act 1992, s 16 and the First Schedule. 
15 
Libel and the Media (1997, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom). 
16 
Libel and the Media ( 1997, Oxford University Press. United Kingdom), 191. 
i ; [1916-1917] All ER 157, 170 per Lord Atkinson. For a more in depth discussion see S Todd 
(ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (1997. Brookers, Wellington) 918. 
18 Lange 1998, above n l , 440. 
19 
Lange 1998, above n 1, 440. See also Mowlds v Fergusson (1940) 64 CLR 206, 215 per 
Dixon J. 
9 
interest will be present. This factor substantially restricts common law qualified 
privilege and is illustrated by previous authority in the context of political 
discussion. In Templeton v Jones2° a defence of qualified privilege failed because 
the defendant's action of having his press notes distributed to the parliamentary 
press gallery, which therefore constituted general publication, went beyond what 
was reasonably necessary for communicating with his constituents.
21 In Truth v 
Holloway22 the Privy Council denied the publisher, Truth, a defence of qualified 
privilege for generally published allegations of corruption against Cabinet minister 
Phil Holloway. If Lange 2000 had been in force when these cases were decided, 
qualified privilege would most likely have arisen. Prior to Lange there was little 
recognition for generally published statements. However in some extreme 
situations the common law had recognised qualified privilege in instances of 
general publication. For example, in Perera v Pe;,-;s2
3 general publication of parts 
of a Bribery Commission report about members of the State Council of Ceylon 
attracted privilege. 
General publication was therefore only justified in very limited circumstances. A 
person wishing to make allegations would have to be very conscious of how 
widely they published their statements. Also, a person who originates the 
defamatory statement can be liable for other publications if this was a natural and 
probable consequence of the original publication.
24 In my opinion the pre-Lange 
law unduly chilled free speech. 
B The High Court 
In October 1995 the monthly magazine North and South published an article, 
written by Joe Atkinson, which heavily criticised David Lange' s performance as 
Prime Minister. Mr Lange claimed that sixteen passages in the article, and the 
accompanying cartoon, in their ordinary meaning meant, and were understood to 
20 [1984] 1 NZLR -+48 (CA) [Templeton v Jonesl. 
21 Templeton v Jones, above n 20, 459. 
22 [1961] NZLR 22 (PC) [Truth v !fo//011•ay]. 
23 [1949] AC l (PC). 
24 See Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991 J l QB 283 (CA). 
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mean, that Mr Lange was dishonest, lazy, insincere, and irresponsible and that the 
words complained of were intrinsically malicious. 25 Mr Lange issued proceedings 
claiming damages for defamation against Mr Atkinson and against the magazine's 
publisher.26 The defendants, in their defence, claimed that they were protected by 
a defence of political discussion. The defence was pleaded both as a stand alone 
defence and as part of qualified privilege. Mr Lange sought to have the defence 
struck out as not recognised by law. 
The strike out application went firstly before Elias J in the High Court. The 
application was refused . Elias J held that the common law did not recognise a 
separate defence of political discussion but that it could form a category of 
qualified privilege. She defined the width of political discussion as : "discussion 
which bears upon the function of electors in a representative ... . "27 
In extending qualified privilege Elias J was unwilling to restrict the new privilege 
by requiring a defendant to act reasonably. She thought that such a requirement 
would be inconsistent with the Defamation Act. 28 Elias J directed that the two 
defences, one for political discussion as a stand alone defence and the other for 
political discussion under qualified privilege, should be pleaded as one and 
declined to strike the proceedings out .29 The decision was appealed . 
The result of Elias J's judgment, like that of the majority in Lange 1998, increases 
the right to free speech without a corresponding increase in the protection of 
. ,o reputation. -
"
5 
Lange 1998, above n 1. 429. The sixteen allegedly defamatory pieces are underlined in the 
article which is found in Appendix 1. These are the passages alleged by Mr Lange ' s counsel to 
be defamatory. 
:
6 Australian Consolidated Press. 
2
- Lange 1997. aboYe n I. 46. 
28 Lange 1997, above n 1, -+9 
29 Lange 1997, above n l , -+9. 
30 
This is illustrated more thoroughly below under the discussion of the majority decision in 
Lange 1998, see Part III C. 
11 
C The Court of Appeal- Round 1 (Lange 1998) 
While Lange 1998 was updated by Lange 2000, much of the reasoning was not 
altered and is therefore still relevant. In a lengthy judgment, the court dismissed 
the appeal by substantially affirming the decision of Elias Jin the High Court . The 
Court agreed that the common law could now recognise a qualified privilege 
defence of political discussion. Tipping J delivered a separate opinion. He agreed 
that the common law should recognise the new privilege but differed in relation to 
how the privilege should be limited. 
1- The decision of the majority 
The majority did not recognise political discussion as a stand-alone defence but as 
a subset of qualified privilege. Like the High Court, the majority refused to 
introduce a reasonableness requirement or some other added protection for 
reputation. 
In order to put qualified privilege in context, the majority began by discussing 
other defences to defamation. After .a review of the development of qualified 
privilege, the majority then entered a lengthy discussion of how other jurisdictions 
have dealt with political discussion.
3 1 Their only conclusion was that different 
approaches are taken across the globe. 
Some important constitutional features were then outlined as supporting the 
extension of qualified privilege. The change in electoral system, from first past 
the post to mixed member proportional, was discussed as indicating a more direct 
recognition of the competition organised by political parties for the power of the 
state.32 The addition of list candidates and the party vote has given more New 
Zealanders a greater interest in political discussion. On a national level it must 
31 Lange J 998, above n I, .+50--+59. The majority examined decisions from Canada, United 
States, United Kingdom. Australia. It also considered decisions under the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
32 Lange 1998, above n l, -l63. 
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however be noted that many current and aspiring members of parliament are not 
on party lists. Therefore this reasoning does not support the Court of Appeal's 
broad conclusion that all New Zealanders have an interest in criticising all current, 
former and aspiring parliamentarians. 33 
The change m access to government documents brought about by the Official 
Information Act 1982 was then mentioned . The majority stated that this 
legislation stood for the principle that information should be made available unless 
there are good reasons for withholding it. 34 However, Templeton v Jones, 
decided after the introduction of the Official Information Act, firmly rejected a 
defence of political discussion. 35 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBOR) was also discussed. The 
Court of Appeal ' s analysis was lacking in its use of the NZBOR. The Act was 
not discussed until late in the judgment and then the majority did nothing more 
than outline the relevant law; there was no substantive analysis . This was not 
improved upon in Lange 2000 and is more fully discussed below.36 
These considerations led the court to formulate a five-point conclusion which 
extended the scope of qualified privilege at common law: 37 
(1) The defence of qualified privilege may be available in respect of a stc1tement 
which is published generally. 
(2) The nature of New Zealand 's democracy means that the wider public may 
have a proper interest in respect of generally published statements which 
directly concern the functioning of representative and responsible 
government. including statements about the performance or possible 
perfonnance of specific individuals in elected public office. 
(3) In particular, a proper interest does exist in respect of statements made about 
33 The Court of Appeal 's conclusions are outlined below. see Part II C I. 
34 Lange J 998, above n L -+63 citing the Official Information Act 1982, s 5. 
35 Templeton v Jones. above n 20, 455 . 
36 See Part III D. 
37 Lange 1998, above n 1, 467--+68. 
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actions and qualities of those currently or formerly elected to Parliament and 
those with immediate aspirations to such office, so far as those actions and 
qualities directly affect or affected their capacity (including their personal 
ability and willingness) to meet their public responsibilities. 
(4) The determination of the matters which bear on that capacity will depend on 
a consideration of what is properly a matter of public rather than of private 
concern. 
(5) The width of the identified public concern justifies the extent of the 
publication. 
Lange 1998 gave a green light to political discussion which, in what is a delicate 
balancing act between two competing rights, tipped the scales in favour of free 
speech. 
The majority was unwilling to restore the equilibrium by imposing additional 
protections for reputation. They refused to follow the Australian approach and 
require that the defendant's conduct be reasonable in order to attract privilege.
38 
Its primary reason for rejecting this standard was that neither the common law nor 
the legislature had in the past imported a duty of care into the defence of qualified 
privilege. 39 Negligence, they said, has no role to play in the law of defamation.
40 
Furthermore the majority thought that it would be inconsistent with other 
defamation defences to introduce a reasonableness requirement into qualified 
privilege. 41 In addition the majority asked how a legitimate interest to receive 
information can differ simply because the author has failed to take reasonable 
care. 42 
38 New South Wales employs the "reasonableness·· standard through s 22 of the Defamation Act 
1974 (NSW). Federally it is employed through the common law. sec Theophanous v Herald & 
Week~y Times Ltd (199-l) 12-l ALR 1 (HC): Stephens v /!"est Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 
24 ALR 80 (HC); Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (l 997) 145 ALR 96 (HC) 
[Lange v ABC]. The "reasonableness" standard under the New South Wales Defamation Act 
and the common law " reasonableness" standard are considered to be the same. see S Walker 
"Lange v ABC: the High Court rethinks the ' constitutionalisation' of defamation .. (1998) 6 TLJ 
1. 
39 Lange 1998. above n I, 469. 
40 Lange 1998, above n I. 469 citing Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney-General [1989] 3 NZLR 
148, 155-157 (CA); Balfour v Attorney-General [1991] I NZLR 519, 529 (CA); South Pacific 
A!anufacturing Co Ltd v Nell' Zealand Security Consultants & investigations Ltd [ 1992] 2 
NZLR 282 , 298-299 (CA). 
41 Lange 1998, above n 1, -l70. 
42 Lange 1998, above n l , 469-470. 
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While these may all be valid points against introducing a reasonableness 
requirement, the majority failed to discuss other ways of restoring the equilibrium 
between the rights of free speech and reputation. The practical result of Lange 
1998 meant that, in the case of political speech, qualified privilege would 
inevitably arise and could only be defeated by overcoming the high threshold of 
malice found in section 19 of the Defamation Act 1992. 43 This would have meant 
that in cases of political discussion, qualified privilege would most likely be a 
successful defence. People had the ability to speak carelessly about politicians 
with no repercussions if their statements turned out to be false. 44 Therefore 
Lange 1998, in my opinion, advanced free speech at the cost of reputation . The 
New Zealand Law Commission45 and other commentators46 also thought this. 
2- The decision of Tipping J 
Tipping J, in a separate opinion, agreed that qualified privilege should be 
developed to encompass political discussion. 47 However he differed from the 
majority in relation to what, if any, restraints should be imposed on the privilege 
in order to protect reputation. He noted that the public do have a valid interest in 
receiving political information and that qualified privilege should recognise this 
"provided there is sufficient counter-balancing protection for those defamed" .48 
Tipping J stated that the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct could be 
relevant when establishing whether the occasion of privilege has been misused 
under section 19 of the Defamation Act 1992:49 
43 Section 19 was designed to codify the common law concept of malice. However, after Lange 
2000 s 19 is now far wider than common law malice, see below Part III B. 
44 See "NZLC Preliminary Report". above n 4, 1. 
45 See "NZLC Preliminary Report". above n .i . 
46 See ··Has Lange Tipped the Balance too FarT, above n .i . Sec also J Burrows "Defamation 
and Politicians" ( 1999) Tort Law Review 8; W Rogers "Privilege and the Media" ( 1999) Tort 
Law Review 13 . 
47 Lange 1998, above n L 473. 
48 Lange 1998, above n L 473. 
49 Lange 1998, above n 1, 475. 
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[T]he circumstances in which the statement is made and the amount of care 
which has been taken in establishing the facts, could well be relevant to whether 
the maker of the political statement, has, or has not, misused the occasion. 
By not only recognising the importance of political discussion but also increasing 
the protection for reputation, Tipping J did, in my opinion, a better job than the 
majority in balancing free speech and reputation. 
Tipping J reached this result in the context of the NZBOR. He began his analysis 
by stating that the striking of the balance between the two rights must be informed 
by section 5 of the NZBOR. 50 Tipping J recognised the imbalance created by the 
approach of the majority and rectified this by allowing the reasonableness of a 
defendant's conduct to be relevant to whether the occasion of privilege has been 
misused . 
The decision was appealed to the Privy Council. 
D The Privy Council 
The Privy Council allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal. However, the court did not substitute its own decision 
but instead remitted the case back to the New Zealand Court of Appeal for 
rehearing. The Privy Council took this approach because it recognised "that 
striking a balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation 
calls for a value judgment which depends upon local political and social 
conditions" . 51 It gave the New Zealand Court of Appeal the opportunity of 
rethinking its earlier decision in light of the change in English law arising from 
Reynolds. 52 
50 Lange 1998, above n 1, 474. 
51 Lange 2000-PC, above n 1, 263 . 
52 Lange 2000-PC. above n 1. 263 . 
16 
E Reynolds 
Reynolds was heard at the same time as the Lange appeal by the same judges, 
only in Reynolds the court was in its capacity as the House of Lords and not the 
Privy Council. 
Reynolds involved the publication, in The Sunday Times in Britain, of allegations 
that the former Irish prime minister, Albert Reynolds, had deliberately and 
dishonestly misled the Dail. The incident arose over the appointment of the Irish 
Attorney-General, who Reynolds supported, to the presidency of the High Court . 
Reynolds was accused of suppressing crucial information about the Attorney-
General. Reynolds sued the paper for defamation. 
The House of Lords rejected any form of generic qualified privilege, which it 
viewed Lange 1998 as creating, 53 for political discussion. Cases of political 
speech, like all other categories of speech, will have to be decided, in the United 
Kingdom at least, individually under the common law duty/interest test. 
In delivering the leading judgment Lord Nicholls54 made many valid points which, 
in my opinion, clearly illustrate the failures of the majority judgment in Lange 
1998. Lord Nicholls began his substantive reasoning with freedom of expression. 
He noted that the right can be limited in order to protect reputation which is in 
turn conducive to the "public good" . 55 
Lord Nicholls went on to state that the crux of the appeal lay in identifying the 
restrictions which are fairly and reasonably necessary for the protection of 
reputation. 56 This point is clearly correct. The importance of free and frank 
political discussion in a democracy is undeniable: the difficult issue is deciding 
53 See Reynolds Hl, above n 9, 621 per Lord Nicholls. 54 Lord Cooke (637) and Lord Hobhousc (657) agreed with the result and reasoning forwarded by Lord Nicholls . 
55 Reynolds Hl, above n 9, 622 . 
56 Reynolds HL , above n 9, 622 . 
17 
how to give effect to this without trammelling the right to reputation. This style 
of analysis is absent from the majority decision in Lange 1998. 
Lord Nicholls's next point illustrates the inadequate protection which Lange 1998 
afforded reputation. The common law malice standard, codified in New Zealand 
under section 19 of the Defamation Act 1992, combined with the practical 
difficulties associated with proving malice make it extremely hard to defeat 
qualified privilege. 57 Lord Nicholls therefore concluded that: "some further 
protection for reputation is needed if this can be achieved without a 
disproportionate incursion into freedom of expression. "
58 
Lord Nicholls, and the Court, concluded that the existing common law could best 
strike the balance between the two competing rights. He provided a non-
exhaustive list of ten factors which could be relevant in deciding whether the 
duty/interest test is satisfied:
59 
(I) The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the 
public is misinformed and the individual ham1ed, if the allegation is not true. (2) 
The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject is a matter of 
public concern. (3) The source of the information. Some informants have their 
own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories. ( 4) The steps taken to 
verify the information. (5) The status of the information. The allegation may 
have already been the subject of an investigation which demands respect. (6) 
The urgency of the matter. News is often a perishable commodity. (7) Whether 
comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may have information others do not 
possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not always be 
necessary. (8) Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff's side of the 
story. (9) The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an 
investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements of fact . (10) The 
circumstances of the publication, including the timing. 
57 Difficulties associated with the burden of proof are discussed below. See below, Part IV C and 
D. 
58 Reynolds HL , above n 9, 623 . 
59 Reynolds HL. above n 9. 626. 
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While Reynolds does not expressly recognise political discussion as a category of 
qualified privilege, it does recognise the importance of free speech and in 
particular political free speech. The judgment advances the common law60 and 
anticipates that the duty/interest test will now be more readily satisfied in cases of 
general publication:61 
Above all , the court should have particular regard to the importance of freedom 
of expression. The press discharges vital functions as a bloodhound as well as a 
watchdog. The court should be slow to conclude that a publication was not in the 
public interest and, therefore. the public had no right to know, especially when 
the information is in the field of political discussion . Any lingering doubts 
should be resolved in favour of publication. 
I submit that Reynolds strikes a far better balance than the majority in Lange 
1998. Reynolds is very different to Lange in that it does not categorise types of 
speech. Political speech, like all other types of speech, must satisfy the 
duty/interest test to attract privilege. 
III- LANGE 2000 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal began by citing two passages from the Privy 
Council decision.62 These passages stated that New Zealand was not bound to 
follow Reynolds and that it must take an approach consistent with local political 
and social conditions.63 From this beginning, the Court of Appeal decided against 
following the Reynolds approach. But instead of leaving its earlier decision 
untouched, the Court made some significant changes. The Court stated that it 
was of "first importance to keep conceptually separate the questions whether the 
60 See below, Part VD. 
61 Reynolds HL , above n 9. 626. 
62 Lange 2000, above n 1. 2-3 . 
63 Lange 2000-PC, above n 1, 261, 263. 
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occasion is privileged and, if so, whether the occasion has been misused".
64 From 
this starting premise the Court moved on to redefine the rules concerning political 
discussion in two parts, the first relating to whether an occasion is privileged, the 
second relating to misuse of the occasion of privilege. 
A The Occasion of Privilege 
The Court felt a "need for amplification"
65 of its earlier five point conclusion. 
After accepting that their earlier decision could be interpreted "as suggesting that 
a communication within the qualifying subject matter will always attract qualified 
privilege",66 the court added a sixth concluding point:
67 
6. To attract privilege the statement must be published on a qualifying 
occasion. 
An objective reading of Lange J 998 clearly suggests that, at least in 1998, the 
Court of Appeal created a generic subset of qualified privilege for certain 
statements about current, former or aspiring parliamentarians.
68 The privilege 
cannot now be considered strictly generic. However, it is my view that the 
"generic" nature of the political discussion defence remains largely intact. While 
the court held that in all situations it will be necessary to inquire whether the 
publication was made on a qualifying occasion, it also noted that:
69 
This requirement for the occasion to qualify, as well as the subject matter, may 
sometimes lead to difficulties at the margins. but in reality there is likely to be 
comparatively little uncertainty in this area . Any bona fide communication in 
the course of political discussion and within the defined subject matter is verJ 
likely to be made on an occasion of qualified privilege. The possibility of the 
64 Lange 2000. above n l, para 4. This can be compared to the approach taken in Reynolds HL 
where misuse of the occasion is part of the consideration of whether the privilege arises. 
65 Lange 2000, above n I, para 21. 
66 Lange 2000, above n I , para 22. 
67 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 41. 
68 Point 3 of the 1998 conclusion stated that a proper interest "does exist" in relation to former. 
current and aspiring parliamentarians. See above Part II C 1. 
69 Lange 2000, above n I. para 21 . 
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occasion not attracting privilege is unlikely to cause difficulty for news media 
organisations. or indeed others who are engaged in genuine political discussion. 
Such possibility. and the small level of uncertainty it may cause, is a necessary 
price to pay to guard reputations against false imputations made on occasions 
which are outside the purpose of privilege; albeit within its literal subject matter. 
When deciding whether a statement was made on a qualifying occasion reference 
should include "the identity of the publisher, the context in which the publication 
occurs, and the likely audience, as well as the actual content of the information" 70 
The Court gave an example of a situation where no privilege would arise. This 
was where an article in a motoring magazine, about a person's activities in sport, 
made a one-line reference to alleged conduct of a grave nature. 71 Any genuine 
political discussion is likely to attract privilege. 72 
When the above points are considered together in light of Lange 1998 it seems 
clear that the new point six represents only a slight change to the 1998 position. 
Qualified privilege for political discussion will arise in all but the most extreme 
cases. Although "does exist" in 1998 means "may exist" in 2000, 73 any genuine 
statements made in the course of political discussion will give rise to a qualified 
privilege defence. 
It should be noted that the introduction of point six has slightly shifted the balance 
between the competing rights of reputation and free speech. The Court expressly 
stated that they would not strike the balance differently from Lange 1998 . 74 
However, by narrowing the scope of scenarios where the defence will arise, the 
balance has shifted marginally in favour of reputation. When this is coupled with 
the introduction of the requirement to act responsibly, 75 Lange 2000 is, overall, 
far more favourable to reputation than Lange 1998. 
-,, Lange 2000, above n l , para 13 . 
71 Lange 2000. above n 1. para 13 . 
7' - Lange 2000, above n 1, para 21. 
73 B Atkin, S Price '"Lange 2000'. (2000) NZLJ 236, 236 . 
7
~ Lange 2000, above n l, para 38. 
75 See belm\· Part TU B. 
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B Misuse of the Occasion of Privilege 
Section 19( 1) of the Defamation Act 1992 provides that : 
19(1) In any proceedings for defamation, a defence of qualified privilege 
shall fail if the plaintiff proves that, in publishing the matter that is the subject of 
the proceedings. the defendant was predominantly motivated by ill will towards 
the plaintiff, or otherwise took improper advantage of the occasion of publication. 
AJthough it does not do so explicitly, section 19(1) was designed to codify the 
common law concept of malice.
76 Lord Diplock' s speech in Horrocks v Lowe
77 
(Horrocks) is generally accepted as the leading authority on common law malice. 
The defendant must either publish the material with knowledge of its falsity or 
with reckless disregard to its truth.
78 Carelessness is not enough.
79 Following 
Lange 2000, section 19 malice is now far wider than the test outlined by Lord 
Diplock in Horrocks. The Court, following Tipping J's lead in Lange 1998,
80 
thought it appropriate to extend the concept of malice, particularly misuse of 
occasion, to make it easier to defeat qualified privilege. The Court did so in order 
to restore the equilibrium between the competing rights of reputation and free 
speech: 81 
The idea of taking improper advantage of the occasion is important when one is 
considering the appropriate balance between freedom of expression and 
protection of reputation. Its connotations are potentially wider than the 
traditional concept of malice ... 
While granting qualified privilege for political discussion is an increase in 
recognition for the right to free speech, developing the concept of malice is a 
76 Lange 2000, above n L para 42: B Atkin. S Price "Lange 2000" (2000) NZLJ 236, 237: Rt 
Hon Justice McKay, Laws NZ. Defamation. para 123. 
77 [1974] 1 ALL ER 662 (HL). 
78 Horrocks v Lowe (1974] 1 ALL ER 662. 669 (HL). 
79 See Reeves v Saxon (17 December 1992) unreported. Court of Appeal, CA 134/89 17. 
applying Horrocks v Lowe [1974] I ALL ER 662 . 
80 Lange 1998, above n 1, 473 . 
81 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 39. 
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corresponding increase in protection for reputation . "One development is 
therefore capable of being matched by another so that the overall balance is kept 
· " 82 nght . Those who wish to rely on qualified privilege for political discussion will 
have to ensure that the privilege is responsibly used . "If the privilege is not 
responsibly used, its purpose is abused and improper advantage is taken of the 
r u occasion" . ~ The legal test can be stated as follows: 
Has there been a failure to give such responsible consideration to 
the truth or falsity of the statement as should have been given in all 
the circumstances? 
If the answer is yes then the person will be regarded as reckless and the occasion 
will have been misused .85 Conceptually placing the responsibility standard in 
relation to other legal standards is not easy. While the Court of Appeal again 
rejected the Australian standard of reasonableness, it is my opinion that the 
responsibility standard is substantially similar to this standard . Both will require 
an examination of objectively assessed factors and each will focus on aspects of 
the defendant's conduct. Also each standard will operate on a sliding scale 
dependent on the nature of the allegation and the intended dissemination. 86 The 
more serious the allegation and the wider the dissemination, the more steps a 
defendant will usually have to take in order to appear responsible in New Zealand 
and reasonable in Australia. The Court of Appeal themselves recognised that :87 
[T]o require the defendant to give such responsible consideration to the truth or 
falsity of the publication as is required by the nature of the allegation and the 
width of the intended dissemination. may in some circumstances come close to a 
need for the taking of reasonable care. 
8" - Lange 2000, aboYe n 1, para 39. 
83 Lange 2000. above n L para -l2. 
8
~ Applying Lange 2000. above n 1, para -l7 . 
85 Lange 2000, above n 1, para -+ 7. 
86 Lange 2000, above n 1. para -l9 ; Lange v ,-JBC, above n 38. 572-573 . 8
' Lange 2000, above n l , para -l8. 
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In New Zealand, a defendant's conduct must be labelled "responsible" in order to 
enjoy the new privilege, in Australia it must be labelled "reasonable". While the 
Court of Appeal clearly did not intend the two standards to always be the same, in 
my opinion differences between the two are likely to only be semantic. 88 
The responsibility standard extends the ways in which qualified privilege may be 
defeated. 89 The burden of proof therefore lies on the plaintiff. The defendant, 
though, will not be able to sit idle: "if the publisher is unable or unwilling to 
disclose any responsible basis for a asserting a genuine belief in truth, the jury may 
well be entitled to draw the inference that no such belief existed . "90 
A defendant will need to be proactive and present evidence showing that they 
acted responsibly in making the statement in question. 
C Is New Zealand justifiably different from the United 
Kingdom? 
In line with other decisions, 91 the Privy Council recognised that New Zealand 
could adopt its own approach according to its unique environment. The Court of 
Appeal, in deciding not to follow Reynolds, was therefore forced to justify its 
decision by showing that New Zealand political and social conditions are different 
from those found in the United Kingdom. 
In fact the court noted very few factors in distinguishing the two countries. It 
cited a passage from the report of the Committee on Official Information
92 as 
88 The Law Commission has also expressed this view, see '"NZLC Report 64'' , above n 8, para 
19-20. 
89 Whether the extension applies to all types of qualified privilege is unclear and is further 
discussed in Part V D below. 
90 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 43 . 
91 See for example Jnvercargi/1 City Council v Hamlin [ 1996] l NZLR 513 (PC). 
92 Towards Afore Open Government (Government Press, Wellington, 1980). 
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authority for the proposition that New Zealand is a small country whose 
government has an extensive and pervasive involvement in everyday national 
life. 93 However, any democratically elected government impacts greatly upon 
everyday life, New Zealands no more so than Britains. Furthermore it must be 
questioned whether the passage cited by the Court of Appeal is relevant twenty 
years after it was written. That very same passage notes New Zealand's focus on 
state ownership and control of major assets, as an alternative to overseas 
ownership and control, as one unique and distinguishing factor. Such reasoning is 
far less persuasive today considering the extent to which State Owned Enterprises 
have been privatised. Also market deregulation has been prominent in New 
Zealand ' s economic policy in the last twenty years .9-i New Zealand is very 
different to what it was in 1980. 
The court also stated that the British press is less responsible than the New 
Zealand press. While this may be true as a generalisation, New Zealand media 
organisations are just as able to harm reputations as their British counterparts. 
Furthermore complaints against the media are increasing,95 and surely the court 
should approach the problem on a worst case scenario basis. 
The Court of Appeal noted further that New Zealand's dailies are generally of a 
"regional character"_% On the other hand many British dailies are distributed 
nation-wide and are therefore in more direct competition with each other. 
Although not stated by the Court of Appeal, this presumably means that there is 
less risk for irresponsible journalism in New Zealand . However, there is 
significant competition for daily news in New Zealand, for example a Wellington 
news-seeker can choose from a number of news sources including the Dominion, 
Evening Post and New Zealand Herald. Furthermore non-newspaper news 
sources like television and the Internet are also available . 
93 Lange ]000, above n l , para 32. 
94 For example the market for postal services has been recently deregulated. 95 For example the number of complaints heard by the Broadcasting Standards Authority are 
increasing. 184 were heard in 1999 compared with 239 heard in 2000. Complaints figures can 
be found at www.bsa.govt.nz. 
96 Lange 2000. above n I, para 35 . 
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The Court of Appeal also compared circulation numbers of British and New 
Zealand publications. Circulation numbers are of course relevant to the amount 
of damage that a false statement may cause. However, it is hard to see how this is 
relevant in deciding whether a plaintiff should be entitled to recover damages for 
reputational harm. Furthermore, New Zealand's circulation figures are hardly 
insignificant, the New Zealand Herald for example distributes approximately 213 
OOO copies daily. 97 The Court of Appeal did not bother to compare readership 
numbers as a ratio of total population. 
The Court also reiterated aspects of Lange 1998. New Zealand's electoral 
system, the Official Information Act 1982 and the NZBOR were again discussed. 
Differences between the NZBOR and the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 
199898 were outlined. The latter Act does significantly differ in some respects, for 
example in relation to the right of privacy. However, in relation to free speech 
and reputation there is little difference. As Lord Cooke noted : "the existing 
balance between the right to personal reputation and freedom of speech has been 
gradually developed over the years by common law and statute. "
99 The recent 
codification of the rights, in both jurisdictions, by the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 and the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 does not mean that 
the rights should be applied differently in the two jurisdictions. The rights are 
dynamic concepts that require a judgement call according to each fact scenario. 
Any differences in the statutory framing of the rights, between the two 
jurisdictions, is unlikely to be determinative. This view is supported by the fact 
that both New Zealand and the United Kingdom call on the European Convention 
on Human Rights when solving human rights problems. 
100 The Convention 
97 Source, New Zealand Audit Bureau of Circulations Inc. Summary of A udited Circulations, 
period ended 31 March 2000. 
98 The Act comes into force in October 2000. 
99 Reynolds HL , above n 9, 6-lO per Lord Cooke. 
100 It should be noted that New Zealand courts, when referring to international human rights 
treaties, use the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights more than the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
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featured in Lange 1998101 and was central to the reasoning of Lord Nicholls m 
Reynolds. 102 
The Official Information Act does emphasise the importance of access to 
information as the Court of Appeal notes. On the other hand, it must be noted 
that the Act recognises information should be withheld in some broadly defined 
situations, for example where it would be used for improper gain. 103 The Act 
provides wide grounds for denying requests for information . 
New Zealand's electoral system, although not that different to some found in 
Europe, 104 is one factor that potentially differentiates New Zealand from the 
United Kingdom. However, it is hard to see how this could have a significant 
bearing on the issue. This is especially so when considering the similarities 
between the two jurisdictions. Both feature parliamentary democracies based on 
universal suffrage. Both governments are responsible to their respective 
parliaments which in turn answer to the electorate. Former president of the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal, Lord Cooke of Thorndon, certainly believed the two 
jurisdictions to be materially similar: 105 
As I see it, however, the United Kingdom is no less a representative democracy 
with responsible government than. .. New Zealand. For the purposes of 
defamation law, the background or context does not seem materially different. 
The constitutional structures vary. but the prevailing ideals are the same. 
Freedom of speech on the one hand and personal reputation on the other have the 
same importance in all democracies. 
Another commentator has also questioned whether New Zealand is different 
enough to justify taking a different approach. 106 Overall the two jurisdictions are 
101 Lange 1998, above n 1, 457 . 
102 Reynolds HL , above n 9, 625. 
103 Official Information Act 1980, s 9(2)(k). 
104 See Reynolds Hl, above n 9, 654 per Lord Hope. 
'
05 Reynolds HL , above n 9, 641. 
106 B Atkin "Let-Down in Lange" 1999 NZLJ 442. -+42-443 . 
27 
1 in my opinion very similar. While subtle differences may exist, they hardly justify 
taking an alternate approach. 
D What happened to the New Zealand Bill of Rights? 
Although Lange 2000 improved the balance between free speech and reputation, 
both of the Court of Appeal's judgments, I submit, fail to give adequate reference 
to New Zealand's primary tool for managing fundamental rights- the NZBOR. 
This failure is illustrated by the majority ' s judgment in Lange 1998 and is not 
improved upon in Lange 2000. 
The majority's reference to the NZBOR was relegated to very late in the 
judgment and then did no more than briefly outline the relevant law. There was 
no substantial analysis in deciding the difficult issue of how reputation and free 
speech should be balanced. The starting point should have been to point out, as 
Elias J did in the High Court, 107 that the Act applies to the common law. 
108 
Although not expressly recognised by the NZBOR, the Act provides for the right 
to reputation in two ways, through section 5, and through section 28 . 
Section 5 provides a general mechanism which is used to limit the rights contained 
in the Act. This can be contrasted with the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) which provides specific reference, under each right, to 
factors that may justifiably limit a right. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has 
recognised that, in applying section 5, courts may use the more detailed 
107 [l997J 2 NZLR 22, 32. 
108 The Court of Appeal's failure to endorse Elias rs view that the NZBOR applies to the 
common law means that the proposition is still unsettled in New Zealand. In my opinion the 
common law is subject to the NZBOR; s 3 states that the Act applies to the judicial branch of 
government. For a summary of the arguments for and against applying the NZBOR to the 
judiciary sec A Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and Private Common Law 
Litigation" [1991] NZLJ 261. 
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prov1s1ons of the ICCPR to aid the outcome. 109 One of the specific factors 
recognised by the ICCPR, as a justifiable limit on free speech, is the right to 
reputation. 110 This is one way in which the Court of Appeal could have used the 
right to reputation in order to limit free speech. 
Another way is through section 28, which provides that other rights are not 
abrogated by those found in the Act. Reputation, considered to be one such 
right, 111 is therefore arguably not just a limiting factor under section 5 but also a 
stand-alone right preserved by the NZBOR. If this approach is taken, then 
reputation would have to be balanced directly against freedom of expression. 
It seems clear that the majority in Lange 1998 did not keep these points in mind in 
reaching the result they did. The practical result of Lange 1998 was to greatly 
advance freedom of expression at the expense of reputation . This can be 
contrasted with the results reached by Tipping J in Lange 1998 and Lord Nicholls 
in Reynolds. Both started their substantial analysis by focusing on the rights in 
question, Tipping Jin light of section 5 of the NZBOR 11 2 Lord Nicholls in light 
of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998. 11 3 More significantly, both 
judges, after applying this rights centred approach, in my view struck a far better 
balance than the majority in Lange 1998. 
While Lange 2000 improved the balance it added nothing in the way of NZBOR 
analysis . It is interesting to note that the outcome of Lange 2000 is almost 
identical to that reached by Tipping J in Lange 1998. Tipping J, however, by 
focusing on the NZBOR, needed only one attempt to reach this result 
Furthermore, both the Court of Appeal ' s judgments involved section 19 of the 
Defamation Act 1992. Lange 1998 left the section untouched while Lange 2000 
109 Re J (A n Infant): Band B v Direc!Or-Generaf of Social /Ve/fare [1996] 2 NZLR 134 (CA) : 
135; Television New Zealand Ltd v R [1996) 3 NZLR 393 (CA) ; 395 ; Lange 1998. above n I , 
.i66. 
110 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 19. 
111 Television Nell' Zealand v Quinn f1996] 3 NZLR 2-i . 56 per McGechan J (CA). 
11' - Lange 1998, above n 1, 470. 
113 Reynolds HL. above n 9. 621. 
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greatly widened it. Section 6 of the NZBOR provides a mechanism for 
interpreting other statutes when considering human rights contained in the 
NZBOR. If an interpretation consistent with the NZBOR can be given, without 
straining the plain meaning of the section in question, then that interpretation must 
be preferred. In neither judgment did the Court of Appeal refer to section 6 of the 
NZBOR when discussing section 19 of the Defamation Act. This is especially 
hard to justify in relation to Lange 2000 which involved an entirely new and 
enlarged interpretation of section 19 of the Defamation Act. 
The lack of reference to the NZBOR becomes even harder to justify when 
considering other free speech cases considered by the Court of Appeal around the 
same time as Lange. Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review114 involved 
the application of free speech principles to the Films, Videos and Publications 
Classification Act 1993. The decision uses the NZBOR solely to establish how 
best to give effect to free speech. This can be contrasted with Lange which also 
involved statutory interpretation but only made minimal use of the ZBOR. 
E How greatly has the law in New Zealand changed? 
Lange represents, in my view, a substantial change to the law of defamation. The 
existing common law was extremely slow to recognise qualified privilege in 
situations of general publication. 11 5 After Lange 2000 it is clear that this is no 
longer so . Point one of the six point conclusion makes it unequivocally clear that 
qualified privilege can apply to generally published statements. More specifically 
the width of dissemination is no longer relevant for genuine political discussion 
about former, current or aspiring parliamentarians. In other situations general 
11 ~ (8 November 1999) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA -1-2 /99. The decision was not reported 
at the time of writing this paper. 
115 See Templeton v Jones, above n 20. 459. See also Truth,, Holloway. above n 22 . 
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publication will not be fatal to a claim for qualified privilege but the identified 
public concern must justify the extent of publication.11 6 However, where 
comments relate to the functioning of representative and responsible government, 
point 2 of the Lange conclusion, 117 general publication will be more easily justified 
than before. This is due to the increase in recognition which Lange 2000 gives to 
political speech. 
While Lange 2000 is not the complete triumph for free speech that Lange 1998 
was. It still represents a significant increase in recognition for this fundamental 
right. This point is further illustrated by the fact that qualified privilege will now 
more easily arise in relation to generally published statements that relate to the 
functioning of representative and responsible government .11 8 This is the most 
important proposition to arise from Lange and is fully discussed below. 11 9 This 
point greatly broadens the scope of the political discussion privilege and will allow 
information to flow more freely as those commenting are now more likely to 
successfully defend a defamation action . 120 Just how great that extension will be 
largely depends on how future courts interpret, among others, 12 1 the phrase 
" . d . bi " 122 representative an respons1 e government . 
Furthermore the new responsibility standard has greatly widened section 19 of the 
Defamation Act. That section, which was designed to codify the common law 
concept of malice, traditionally focused on the mental mind state of the defendant. 
The introduction of the need to act responsibly means that the focus is now 
116 Lange 1998. above n l. concluding point 5. 468. Outlined above. see Part TIC l. 
117 See above Part II C 1. 
118 Lange J 998. above n 1. concluding point 2. -l68. Outlined above. see Part II C I. 
119 See Part VA. 
120 It must be noted. however. that a plaintiff can still issue proceedings and will often force a 
defendant to incur large legal costs in defending the action . Even if the defendant wins they will 
still have incurred large expenses. A plaintiff can therefore "win" by " losing". This 
phenomenon has been discussed in the United States, see for example D Boies .. The Chilling 
Effect of Libel Defamation Costs : The Problem a nd Possible Solution" 39 St Louis LJ 1207; P 
Voakes .. Lessons Learned: A Lawsuit's lmpact on Journalistic Behaviour'· 4 Comm L & Pory 
87. 
121 Other factors that still need to be determined will also bear on the issue of how greatly the 
law is changed. for example procedural and pleading problems also require attention. This is 
discussed below, see Part IV D and E . 
m This phrase is discussed below. see Part V A. 
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squarely on the conduct of the defendant. It is, however, unclear whether this 
extension applies to all cases of qualified privilege or only to political discussion. 
This is discussed further in Part V D. 
IV- IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF LANGE 2000 
A How does New Zealand compare to other jurisdictions? 
Appellate courts from Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
have all recently had to decide how to best uphold free speech without too greatly 
infringing on the right to reputation. The United States Supreme Court first 
considered the issue over 35 years ago. Now that the dust has finally settled it is 
possible to reflect on how each jurisdiction balances the two rights and where 
New Zealand sits comparatively. This analysis focuses on the scope of the 
various privileges and the ease with which they may be defeated . A continuum is 
provided which shows how comparatively each country balances the two rights. 
The United States lies at the free speech end of the continuum. The famous case 
of New York Times Co v Sullivan123 (Sullivan) established a wide privilege in 
respect of statements about public officials. The only way to defeat the privilege 
is to show actual malice which requires knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
to the truth of a statement. 124 In later decisions the scope of the privilege has 
been extended to include statements about public figures . 125 Overall, the United 
States awards a broad privilege to criticisms of public people that can only be 
defeated by actual malice. 
In some respects Lange 1998 is similar to the United States approach. Lange 
1998 awarded a privilege, albeit a narrower one, which could only be defeated by 
123 (1964) 376 US 254 (SC). 
114 New York Times Co v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254, 279-280. 
125 See Gertz v Robert Welch Inc. (1974) 418 US 323, 3-l6. 
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proof of the Horrocks standard of malice. 126 Lange 2000 differs from the United 
States approach primarily in three ways. Firstly, by allowing irresponsible 
conduct to amount to misuse of the occasion of privilege, New Zealand allows the 
privilege to be defeated far more easily. Reputation is therefore afforded greater 
protection in New Zealand . Secondly, the scope of the privilege is more limited in 
New Zealand. The United States public figure and public official doctrines allow 
more wide ranging comments to be made about a greater pool of people. 
Alternatively, New Zealand restricts the privilege to statements which concern 
representative and responsible government. The third point relates to disclosure 
of sources. In New Zealand defendants have common law and statutory 
protection which protects them from disclosing their sources in defamation 
actions.127 While these rules are not absolute, they provide much greater 
protection for sources than in the United States where defendants are not entitled 
to protect the confidentiality of their sources. 128 
Canada is at the opposite end of the continuum favouring reputation more than 
the other four jurisdictions. In marked contrast to judgments such as Sullivan, 
Lange 1998 and Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd129 the Supreme 
Court in Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto 130 (Hill) places great emphasis 
on protecting reputation. Although not in the context of political discussion, the 
judgment goes as far as suggesting that protecting reputation and freedom of 
expression are of equal importance: 131 
[T]he protection of the good reputation of an individual is of fundamental 
importance to democratic society. . [ so that] the protection of a person ' s 
reputation is indeed worthy of protection in our democratic society and must be 
carefully balanced against the equally important right of freedom of expression. 
126 This standard, while not identical , is similar to the United States actual malice standard . 127 These mles are fully discussed below, see Part IV D. 
128 See Branzburg v Hayes (1978) 408 US 665. 668. See also Caldero v Tribune Publishing Co. 
(1977) 434 US 930. It should also be noted that a defendant who breaches a confidentiality 
agreement can be liable for damages, see for example Cohen v Cowles Ai edia Co. (1991) 111 S 
Ct 251 3 (SC). 
129 (1994) 124 ALR I (HC). 
130 [1995] 2 SCR 1130. 
131 Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 SCR 1130, 1167. See also NZLC 
Preliminary Report, above n 4, 6. 
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The whole flavour and approach of Hill is unique. The Supreme Court does not 
assume that free speech should automatically trump reputation. Hill goes on to 
hold that the existing common law is consistent with the values of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. Therefore no extension of qualified 
privilege was recognised, the existing common law duty/interest test must still be 
applied in all cases where qualified privilege is raised. 132 Political speech is not 
afforded extra protection. In terms of defeating the privilege Canada lies 
somewhere between the Australian "reasonableness" standard and the British 
malice standard found in Horrocks. In Botiuk v Toronto Free Press Publications 
Ltd133 the Supreme Court noted that Horrocks was generally representative of the 
Canadian position but then went on to apply the recklessness standard more 
liberally. The Supreme Court, in analysing the facts, stated that the defendant's 
failure to undertake a reasonable investigation amounted to recklessness. 134 The 
position in Canada is still developing, so that it is unclear exactly when qualified 
privilege will be defeated. 135 
As illustrated Canada and the United States strike very different balances between 
free speech and reputation. While the United States staunchly favours free 
speech, Canada on the other hand is far more protective of reputation. 
New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom lie somewhere in between. The 
three jurisdictions have all taken conceptually different approaches but all strike 
the balance similarly. However, having said this, I believe there are some subtle 
differences that result in New Zealand favouring free speech slightly more than 
Australia and the United Kingdom. 
132 See R Martin Essentials in Canadian Law- Media Law (Concord, Ontario. 1997) 152-154. It 
is unclear whether Canada will embrace Reynolds the next time the issue arises. However. at 
the time of writing this paper Canada had not done so. 
133 [1995] 3 SCR 3. 
134 Botiuk v Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd [1995] 3 SCR 3. 22-25. 
135 Lange 2000 contains a more in depth discussion of the Canadian approach. see above n 1. 
paras 50-52. 
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As already outlined, 136 the United Kingdom, through Reynolds, has left the 
common law duty/interest test to deal with political discussion. Reynolds did 
however emphasise the importance of political discussion and stress that a court 
should be slow to conclude that the test is not satisfied . 137 
Australia, on the other hand, expressly provides that qualified privilege exists for 
governmental or political matters that affect the people of Australia. 138 The 
privilege is however subject to a reasonableness requirement. The privilege will 
not arise unless the publisher's conduct was considered "reasonable". 139 
Although two conceptually different approaches are taken by Australia and the 
United Kingdom, the balance struck is almost identical. Firstly both recognise the 
importance of political discussion and provide that qualified privilege can arise in 
such cases. Australia does it expressly through a specific category of qualified 
privilege whereas the United Kingdom does it implicitly through the existing 
common law. Secondly, both jurisdictions restrain the privilege similarly. In 
Australia the courts will examine various aspects of a defendant ' s conduct to see 
if they have acted reasonably. United Kingdom courts will also examine conduct, 
not to see if it is "reasonable" but to see whether the necessary duty/interest has 
arisen. i.io Any difference appears to be semantic: both jurisdictions will examine 
almost entirely the same factors to see if the statements were privileged. Lord 
Cooke, speaking in Reynolds, recognised that differences between Australia and 
the United Kingdom are not substantive: 141 
Lord Nicholls has listed. non-exhaustively, matters to be taken into account. As 
the Court of Appeal suggested, this brings English law into a position not very 
different from that produced by the Australian reasonableness test ... 
136 See above Part II D 1. 
137 Revnolds Hl, above n 9. 626. 
138 L;nge v rlBC. above n 38, 115. 
139 New South Wales provides for this through statute. see s 22 of the Defamation Act 197-l 
(NSW). The common law provides the same standard for other states, see above n 38. 
140 Lord Nicholls provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered (See above Part II E) . 
Some of these also focus on the defendant's conduct. 
14 1 Reynolds HL. aboYe n 9. 6-l5. 
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One factor that could potentially set Australia and the United Kingdom apart is 
the Newspaper Rule. This rule allows a defendant to uphold the confidentiality of 
their sources, at interlocutory stages, and therefore makes it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to point to factors which show that the defendant should not be entitled 
to the privilege. 142 In the United Kingdom the Newspaper Rule does not apply in 
"special circumstances". 143 However, what exactly amounts to special 
circumstances has not been defined and no case has found them to exist. The rule 
is therefore almost absolute. 144 Australia on the other hand does allow the rule to 
be defeated in some situations. This is discussed below in Part IV D 2 (b) (ii). 
This means that it is easier for the privilege to be defeated in Australia than it is in 
the United Kingdom. This pushes Australia more towards the reputation end of 
the continuum while the United Kingdom moves towards the free speech end . 
New Zealand's law, in terms of the Newspaper Rule, is currently unsettled but the 
Court of Appeal in Lange 2000 indicated that we might follow the Australian 
approach. 145 This is further discussed below.146 
In New Zealand qualified privilege is likely to anse m most cases of genuine 
political discussion. 147 The privilege is restrained by allowing it to be defeated if 
the defendant has not acted "responsibly". As discussed above, 
148 it is my view 
that this standard is almost identical to the Australian reasonableness standard. 
New Zealand does however boast one important difference. Unlike the other 
two, New Zealand requires that the plaintiff defeat the privilege. The plaintiff 
must prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has acted 
142 It should be noted that the onus in Australia and the United Kingdom. unlike New Zealand. 
is on the defendant to raise the privilege. However, in practice a plaintiff will try to stop this by 
pointing to evidence to show that the privilege shouldn ' t arise. 
143 See for example Lyle-Samuel v Odhams Ltd [1920] I KB 135 (CA). 
144 For a good summary of the history of the Newspaper Rule see Broadcasting Corporation of 
New Zealand v A lex Harvey industries Ltd [1980] l NZLR 163 (CA) [A lex Harvey]. 
145 Lange 2000, above n I , para 57. 
146 See below Part IV C and D . 
147 See above Part Ill A. 
148 See above Part III B. 
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irresponsibly and has therefore misused the occasion. 149 In the United Kingdom it 
is the defendant who must show that the duty/interest test is satisfied. Likewise it 
is Australian defendants who must prove that they have acted reasonably. 
While in reality both the plaintiff and defendant are likely to bring evidence 
relating to the defendant's conduct, the New Zealand approach is more favourable 
to free speech. It awards the privilege first and then asks the plaintiff to defeat it. 
Australia and the United Kingdom on the other hand require defendants to show 
that their conduct warrants protection. It is defendants who must prove they are 
entitled to protect their speech. 
The above analysis can be illustrated as follows: 
Free Speech 
of first importance 
2 3 4 
I I 
1 = United States 
2= New Zealand 
3= United Kingdom 
4= Australia 
5= Canada 
B Impact 011 the Media 
1- Jntroduction 
Free speech 
and reputation equal 
5 
Reputation of 
first importance 
The defence of political discussion in New Zealand is not limited to the media and 
can be pleaded by anyone. It will, however, be the media who will rely on, and 
149 It should also be noted that misuse of the occasion of privilege is a question for the jury 
whereas the occasion itself is decided by the judge. Therefore the " reasonableness" of the 
defendant's conduct (Australia) and the duty/interest test (United Kingdom) are decided by the 
judge. In comparison in New Zealand it is a jury who will decide whether the defendant has 
acted responsibly. 
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benefit from, it the most. When the media prepare and publish stories they are 
forced to rely on certain facts. The media constantly risk defaming people and 
organisations if those facts are false. While other defences, for example honest 
opinion, 150 may be available qualified privilege will often be pleaded. The 
recognition, provided by Lange 2000, that qualified privilege will be more readily 
available for general publication will greatly benefit the media. For it is the media 
that by nature publish to the public at large. This factor meant that under the old 
duty/interest test it was difficult for media defendants to succeed in a claim to 
qualified privilege. 151 The new privilege will be far more readily available to 
media defendants. 
While at first glance the obvious result of Lange 2000 is to facilitate free political 
discussion, which is clearly beneficial to the media, a more in-depth analysis 
reveals some potentially negative impacts. 
2- Judicial standards ofjournalism 
With the extension of section 19 malice to include irresponsibility, plaintiffs will 
now be more likely to bring evidence relating to the conduct of the defendant. 
Similarly defendants will want to bring their own evidence to refute allegations of 
irresponsibility. 152 As a body of precedents accumulates, minimum standards will 
emerge that, if fallen below, will indicate irresponsibility. By the introduction of 
the responsibility standard the Court of Appeal has placed the spotlight squarely 
on the defendant's conduct. Courts will now be forced to examine conduct which 
will result in a de facto code of ethics for the media. 153 This is an interesting 
phenomenon considering that the media profession themselves are staunchly 
opposed to outside regulation. 154 While journalists have always had to be aware 
150 Defamation Act 1992, ss 10-11 
151 See for example Templeton v Jones, above n 20, 459. 
152 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 43 
153 B Atkin, S Price "Lange 2000" (2000) NZLJ 236, 237-238. See also R Bezanson, G 
Cran berg, B Murchison, J Soloski, R Wissler "Sullivan 's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial 
Standards of Journalism" 73 N.C.L Rev 7 ("Sullivan ' s Paradox"); L Bloom "Proof of Fault in 
Media Defamation Litigation" 38 Vand. L. Rev. 2-l7. 
154 See for example A Cropp Digging Deeper: A New Zealand Guide to investigative Reporting 
(New Zealand Journalists Training Organisation, Wellington. 1997) 180 [Digging Deeper]. 
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of the limits imposed by defamation law, they will now have to be especially wary 
of their conduct. For example, a media defendant who has not checked more than 
one independent source or who has failed to seek a reply from the person defamed 
could easily be viewed as irresponsible. 
3- Proving irresponsibility 
Plaintiffs will be forced to use various benchmarks when they attempt to show 
that the defendant has acted irresponsibly. These benchmarks may come in 
various forms. Experienced journalists may be called to give evidence relating to 
acceptable standards. Reference may be had to industry standards such as those 
developed by the Press Council, the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA), the 
New Zealand Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (Journalists ' Union) 
and individual news organisations like Independent News Limited (INL). 
Journalism texts and foreign jurisprudence are also likely to be referred to . 
Industry standards, texts and foreign jurisprudence are separately considered 
below. 
(a) Industry standards15 5 
The Press Council is the only complaints body relating to print media. While 
some publishers do not consent to the Press Council ' s jurisdiction, it now has a 
wide jurisdiction to hear complaints in relation to nearly all print media 
publications, but has little disciplinary power.156 The Press Council has a set of 
Principles which guide adjudications. Unfortunately, like the Journalists' Union, 
BSA157 and INL codes, the Principles are so broad that they will provide little 
assistance in deciding whether certain conduct should be deemed irresponsible. 
However, it would be possible to argue that the standards do require certain 
specific acts. For example cl 7(a) of the Journalists ' Union code arguably requires 
155 The various codes of ethics are outlined in Appendix 2. 
156 See The Twenty-Seventh Report of the New Zealand Press Council 1999. 
157 The Broadcasting Standards Authority has various codes according to the content of the 
broadcast and the medium used Codes relate to Radio, Pay Television, Free-to-Air Television, 
Liquor Promotion. Election Programmes/Advertising. Selected standards from the free-to-air 
code are listed in Appendix 1, the other codes can be found at www.bsa.govt.nz. 
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a journalist, who is a member of the union, to do many things including: to only 
use relevant facts; to not distort facts and therefore show both sides fairly and to 
seek a reply from the person at the centre of the allegations. Clause 7(a) provides 
that: 
7(a) They shall report and interpret the news with scrupulous honesty and 
striving to disclose all essential facts and by not suppressing relevant , available 
facts or distorting by wrong or improper emphasis. 
Such broad non-specific standards hardly promote public confidence in print 
media. Any hope of a more precise code being developed, by the Press Council 
or by the print media organisations themselves, is very unlikely after Lange 2000. 
The introduction of the responsibility standard may in fact dissuade print media 
organisations from formulating more precise standards. This is because a more 
precise formulation could very easily be used against the organisation in court . A 
journalist who did not strictly adhere to their own newspaper's standards would 
clearly appear irresponsible to jury members. On the other hand though it could 
be argued that Lange 2000 encourages organisations to develop more precise 
ethical codes. These codes, if followed, would be able to be used as evidence of 
responsibility. Ironically though Lange 2000 may have created a disincentive to 
formulate more rigid industry standards and could further compound the media' s 
apprehension regarding external regulation. 
(b) Texts 
While the various codes of ethics are very broad, more precise rules may be found 
in journalism texts. One such text, written by Amanda Cropp and supported by 
the New Zealand Journalists Training Organisation, 158 contains exact guidelines 
which could easily be used as ammunition against reporters . For example under 
the title "The Importance of Independent Sources" she provides : 159 
Confirm key facts which are likely to be highly contentious or libellous with at 
least three independent sources. 
158 Digging Deeper, above n 15-t. 
159 Digging Deeper, above n 15-+, 26. 
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And under the heading "Golden Rules for Using Unnamed Sources" she 
"d 160 prov1 es: 
Never use the information unless it can be corroborated by at least one other 
source. In cases where the information is contentious and central to the story 
seek three independent sources. 
The above are just a few of the specific rules provided by Amanda Cropp. A 
failure to comply with these standards will not automatically result in a loss of 
privilege. Exactly what amounts to responsibility will differ from case to case. 
However, once a plaintiff points to a certain standard of conduct, the defendant 
will tactically be forced to bring their own evidence to suggest that a lower 
standard was still "responsible" in the circumstances. For example, it is not 
difficult to envisage Joe Atkinson on the witness stand being asked by Lange' s 
counsel whether he checked three independent sources before alleging that Mr 
Lange was lazy. If three independent sources cannot be pointed to then counsel 
for Mr Atkinson would be wise to bring evidence suggesting that three sources 
were not necessary in that situation. 
( c) Foreign jurisprudence 
In the context of the United States actual malice standard, comprehensive studies 
have been undertaken to analyse the types of journalistic conduct at issue in 
defamation cases.16 1 While the New Zealand responsibility standard is much 
lower than its United States counterpart, the studies do provide useful insight into 
the types of factors likely to be considered in New Zealand. The authors of one 
study, Sullivan's Paradox, 162 conclude that Sullivan has not lived up to its aim of 
alleviating the chilling effect of defamation and that judicial standards of 
journalism have arisen.163 Sullivan 's Paradox examined all parts of the story 
creation process, from the gathering of information to the writing, editing and 
160 Digging Deeper, above n 15-l, 32. 
16 1 See "Sullivan·s Paradox .. , above n 153 ; L Bloom "Proof of Fault in Media Defamation 
Litigation·· 38 Vand. L. Rev. 247. 
162 "Sullivan ' s Paradox", above n 153 . 
163 "'Sullivan ' s Paradox", above n 153, 14. 
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presentation of stories. No factor was found to establish actual malice on its 
own. 164 However, under the much lower threshold in New Zealand one factor 
could easily be enough to persuade a jury that the defendant has acted 
irresponsibly. 
Behaviours often at issue include failure to verify information provided by a 
source, unclear writing, failure to provide an accurate summary of information 
and failure to investigate adequately. It is interesting to note that some of the 
most frequent behaviours found by Sullivan 's Paradox to be at issue relate to a 
defendant ' s sources.165 This is particularly relevant in relation to problems 
associated with the burden of proof 166 
Australia, where journalists wanting to use the defence must act reasonably, also 
considers behavioural factors in deciding whether to grant privilege. In Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting C01poration167 Brennan J gave a minimum standard test 
to which a defendant's behaviour must adhere: 
168 
Whether the making of a publication was reasonable must depend upon all the 
circumstances of the case. But, as a general rnle. a defendant 's conduct in 
publishing material giving rise to a defamatory imputation will not be reasonable 
unless the defendant has reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation 
was trne, took proper steps. so far as they were reasonably open. to verify the 
accuracy of the material and did not believe the imputation to be untrne. 
Furthermore, the defendant ' s conduct will not be reasonable unless the defendant 
has sought a response from the person defamed and published the response made 
(if any) except in cases where the seeking or publication of a response was not 
practicable or it was unnecessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond. 
In other cases, considered under the New South Wales statutory reasonableness 
requirement, 169 courts have had regard to : the manner and extent of publication; 
164 ''Sullivan ' s Paradox·', above n 153. 29. 
165 "Sullivan ' s Paradox'·, above n 153 , 36. 
166 See Part TV C. 
167 Lange v ABC, above n 38. 
168 Lange v ABC. above n 38. 118. 
169 I believe that this requirement is almost identical to the New Zealand responsibility standard, 
see above Part TV A. 
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the connection between the subject and the imputation; the reasonableness of the 
assertion itself; the publisher' s belief in the truth of the statement; the surrounding 
circumstances and the care exercised before publication_l7° 
It should also be noted that reference may even be made to Lord Nicholls ' s ten 
factors which he provided in Reynolds. Many of these factors, provided in Part II 
E above, will be relevant in deciding whether the occasion of privilege has been 
misused . 
3- Conclusion 
Over time New Zealand courts will develop a set of behaviours which will be used 
to prove whether a defendant has acted responsibly . A de facto code of ethics 
will be developed by the judiciary. Media organisations who do not follow it will 
lose the benefit of common law qualified privilege. 
Whether or not judicial standards of journalism are desirable is an entirely 
different issue. Arguably media defendants should be held accountable if they do 
not hold themselves to a responsible standard of conduct. This is especially so 
when it is considered that the level of responsibility required may be taken from 
the media defendants own code of ethics or from an industry code such as the 
BSA code or the Press Council Principles. It seems only fair that media 
defendants are held to a standard of conduct which they themselves say they apply 
anyway. On the other hand it must be remembered that journalists: "act without 
the benefit of a clear line of hindsight. Matters which are obvious in retrospect 
may have been far from clear in the heat of the moment. " 17 1 There is a real risk 
that juries will be too quick to find that a media defendant has acted irresponsibly. 
As Bill Atkin and Steven Price put it : " it will be a talentless plaintiff's lawyer who 
cannot find some way to stoke the jury members ' fire against a media 
defendant. " 172 
170 Wright 1· A ustralian Broadcasting Commission [19771 l NSWLR 697. 71 3 per Reynolds JA 
(NSW SC). See also Austin v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [198-l] 2 NSWLR 383 (NSW SC): Smith 
v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd ( 1986) FLR 343. 
171 Reynolds HL, above n 9, 626 per Lord Nicholls. 
172 B Atkin , S Price "Lange 2000" (2000) NZLJ 236, 238. 
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C Does New Zealand Adequately Protect Reputation?-
Problems Associated with the Burden of Proof 
Lange 2000 is a great improvement on Lange 1998 in terms of protecting 
reputation . Concerns from the Law Commission 173 and commentators174 have 
been partially answered by the introduction of a requirement to act responsibly. 
This standard is far more protective of reputation than the common law malice 
principle. The question that must now be answered is whether this extension to 
section 19 provides enough protection for reputation . Currently the answer to 
this question is, in my opinion, no. While prima facie the responsibility standard is 
in my view adequate to counter-balance the new privilege, certain problems 
associated with the burden of proof mean that this protection is partially negated . 
These problems were briefly addressed by the Court of Appeal in Lange 2000. 
The Court gave some signals as to what changes may occur in the future . 
However, until changes are made reputation will not, in my opinion, be 
adequately protected. New Zealand is currently not adequately protecting 
reputation . The following discussion outlines the problems and examines how 
they might be addressed following the Court of Appeal's leads given in Lange 
2000. Other potential solutions are also discussed and recommendations are 
given. 
It is currently very difficult for a plaintiff, who under Lange 2000 is charged with 
the onus of defeating the new privilege, to obtain evidence to support a claim that 
the privilege of political discussion has been misused . This is due to three rules 
that allow a media defendant to uphold the confidentiality of their sources. These 
rules apply at different stages of the litigation process. 
The first, the Newspaper Rule, is founded in the common law and applies to 
interlocutory proceedings. Its rationale is to allow the free flow of information by 
173 See '·NZLC Preliminary Report'·, above n -t 
174 See "Has Lange Tipped the Balance too Far?", above n 4. See also J Burrows '·Defamation 
and Politicians" ( 1999) Tort Law Review 8: W Rogers ·'Privilege and the Media., (1999) Tort 
Law Review I 3. 
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ensuring that people can speak to the press in confidence. 175 The Newspaper Rule 
overlaps with Rule 285 of the High Court Rules which prohibits interrogatories 
designed to elicit sources in defamation cases. At trial section 35 of the Evidence 
Amendment Act (No. 2) 1980 provides the court with a discretion to excuse 
witnesses from breaching confidential relationships . Information provided to a 
media organisation in confidence is clearly one such relationship. 
While section 35 is at the court ' s discretion, Rule 285 and the Newspaper Rule 
are framed in more absolute terms. Rule 285 is a broad prohibition and the 
Newspaper Rule has been interpreted to be almost absolute . 176 The Court of 
Appeal in Lange 2000 indicated that the latter two might need to be revised in 
order to better protect reputation. However little insight into how this might be 
d · 177 one was given. 
A plaintiff who is trying to show that the defendant has acted irresponsibly will 
not be able to point to factors that relate to undisclosed sources. For example it 
will not be known whether the undisclosed source is reliable, or was misquoted or 
has previously been shown to be biased against the plaintiff Also it will not be 
known whether any disclosed sources are independent of the undisclosed source. 
This will make it difficult to see whether the sources are adequate and whether 
others should have been consulted . Such factors have been recognised as 
important when proving malice both in the United States 178 and the 
Commonwealth.179 This does not mean that plaintiffs ' attempts to defeat privilege 
will be doomed to fail. Plaintiffs will know, amongst other things, how many 
sources there are, who has not been spoken to, whether disclosed sources are 
175 Alex Harve_v, above n 144. 166 per Woodhouse J, 172 per Richardson J. 180 per McMullin J. 176 See A !ex Harvev. above n 144. 
177 The Court of Appeal merely referred to Australian jurisprudence as authority that inroads 
into the Newspaper Ruic may be justified. This is discussed further below, see Part IV D 2 b. 178 See "Sullivan 's Paradox, above n 153 : L Bloom "Proof of Fault in Media Defamation 
Litigation" 38 Vand. L. Rev. 247. 
179 A lex Harvey . above n 144. 172; Lyle Samuel v Odhams Ltd (1920] l KB 1235. 143 per 
Scrutton LJ (CA); So uth Suburban Co-operative Societ_v v Orum f 1937 J 2 KB 690. 700 per 
Scott LJ (CA) . 
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biased and whether the plaintiffs themselves were spoken to . 180 These are all 
factors which can point to irresponsibility. However, having said this, I believe 
the Newspaper Rule and its counterparts are still a substantial burden on plaintiffs 
who wish to defeat the new privilege. The House of Lords, in the context of the 
common law malice standard, has also recognised the difficulties which the 
Newspaper Rule presents for plaintiffs.181 
An associated, albeit smaller, problem is found in section 41 of the Defamation 
Act 1992. Once a defendant pleads qualified privilege, a plaintiff must provide 
particulars which "specify facts or circumstances" 182 that support an allegation of 
section 19 malice. The inability to obtain information about a defendant ' s sources 
will make it difficult to provide such particulars. In the absence of other potential 
conduct faults the defendant will be able to apply to have the section 19 claim 
struck out. The Court of Appeal briefly addressed this issue but thought it to be 
overstated . 183 They said that " in some situations it may well be sufficient to plead 
that the statement was made recklessly, or that the defendant had no honest belief 
in its truth ... ". 184 This comment sends a signal to lower courts that, in "some" 
situations, only minimal particulars will be required . Lange 2000 has left unclear 
what situations will require more than merely minimal particulars. The Court of 
Appeal has left lower courts, lawyers and their clients in a difficult position. 
Should a judge strike out a claim stating nothing more than that the defendant has 
acted recklessly, or should it be allowed to go to trial? The former is consistent 
with the plain meaning of section 41 (2) of the Defamation Act 1992 and its 
emphasis on solving defamation suits promptly. 185 The issue is an important one 
and could very easily decide the issue of whether or not a claim of irresponsibility, 
under section 19 of the Defamation Act 1992, should be struck out for lack of 
particulars. 
180 It should also be noted that the plaintiff can try for disclosure at trial. However, the witness 
may be excused from disclosure under s 35 of the Evidence Amendment Act 1980 (No. 2). 
181 Reynolds HL. above n 9, 623 per Lord Nicholls, 631 per Lord Steyn. 640 per Lord Cooke. 
182 Section 41(2), Defamation Act 1992. 
183 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 59. 
184 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 59. 
185 Gillespie v McKay 13 PRNZ 90, 93. 
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D What are the Options for Solving these problems, and which 
is the Best approach? 
1 Switch the Burden of Proof 
The Law Commission, in following up a preliminary paper, has released a report 
which also highlights procedural and pleading problems. 186 The report 
recommends legislative intervention to provide that qualified privilege will fail for 
general publication unless the defendant proves on reasonable grounds that they 
believed the statement to be true. 187 This changes the burden of proof and largely 
mirrors the approach taken in Australia. 188 While this would solve many of the 
above problems, it is unlikely that Parliament will intervene in the near future . 
Traditionally Parliament has been slow to intervene, the Mckay Commission 
proposals for defamation reform were tabled in 1977 but the Defamation Act was 
not passed until 1992 . Furthermore, this would not in my opinion be the ideal 
approach. I believe the burden should remain on the plaintiff provided that the 
plaintiff is given adequate opportunity to show that the privilege has been 
misused . Leaving the burden on the plaintiff is a rights centred approach. This 
approach awards the fundamental right of free speech first and then asks the 
plaintiff to show why the defendant should be deprived of that right. This 
approach is therefore more consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act . 
Also, simply switching the burden of proof would not solve all of the problems. 
While this would put the onus on defendants to show that they are entitled to the 
privilege, courts would still have to decide when, if ever, defendants should have 
to reveal their sources. The significance of refusing to disclose would also have 
to be established. 
186 See "NZLC Final Report", above n 8. 
187 "NZLC Final Report'·. above n 8. para 11. 
188 This recommendation would import a .. reasonableness.. requirement rather than a 
" responsibility" requirement. As already mentioned (see above Part III B). the two standards 
are. in my opinion. materially similar. Hov,·ever it must be noted that the Court of Appeal 
thought the two to be different. Therefore if the burden is changed it may be more consistent 
with the Court of Appeal 's views to require the defendant to prove that they acted ·'responsibly" 
rather than .. reasonably''. 
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However, the Law Commission's proposal of Parliamentary intervention does 
have benefits. The proposal, if acted on quickly, would avoid much of the 
uncertainty that surrounds the current position. Furthermore, adopting an 
approach consistent with Australia would give New Zealand courts the advantage 
fA 1. · · d 189 o ustra 1an Junspru ence. 
Overall I favour fixing the procedural issues ahead of Parliament introducing a 
reasonableness requirement. This is more consistent with the NZBOR and may be 
the only option if Parliament is unwilling to intervene. It is pointless to sit back 
and hope that Parliament does intervene. 
The Law Commission also recommended some procedural changes if Parliament 
does not adopt the reasonableness requirement. These and other options are 
discussed below. 
2 Attempt to fix the procedural problems 
(a) The pleading problem 
As discussed, the problem revolves around what particulars are required in order 
to plead that the defendant has misused the occasion. The Law Commission 
recommended that section 41 (2) be repealed. 190 This would mean that the 
plaintiff would not have to provide particulars of section 19 malice before the 
trial. While this would solve the problem it relies on Parliamentary intervention 
which, as mentioned, is unlikely. The best option therefore seems to be for judges 
to simply follow the Court of Appeal ' s direction and only require that the plaintiff 
plead that the defendant has acted irresponsibly and therefore recklessly. This 
should, in my opinion, always be sufficient in order to satisfy section 41 (2) where 
confidential sources are at issue. Where they are not other particulars should be 
necessary. This, though, arguably makes it too easy for a plaintiff to survive a 
strike out or summary judgment proceeding and is therefore detrimental to the 
189 For a summary of why the Law Commission recommends Parliament intervene see "NZLC 
Final Report", above n 8, para 2-L 
190 "NZLC Final Report", above n 8. para 25. 
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defendant. However, I believe this to be a justifiable trade-off for a defendant 
who wishes to maintain source confidentiality. If they wish to maintain 
confidentiality then they have to accept that malice may be an issue at trial. 
(b) The Newspaper Rule 
(i) Introduction 
The Court of Appeal stated that the Newspaper Rule might need to be adjusted in 
order to take account of the new privilege available under Lange 2000: 19 1 
The whole question whether sources should be identified before trial is very 
much influenced by public policy as seen in the particular jurisdiction .. . The 
relevant policy considerations must now recognise the ramifications of the 
extended range of qualified privilege as affirmed in this judgment. 
The court referred to the Australian approach, where inroads into the Newspaper 
Rule have been justified, intimating that such an approach may be adopted in New 
Zealand . The following analysis outlines the Australian approach and advocates 
that the approach in John Fai,fax and Sons v Cojuangco192 (Cojuangco) should 
be adopted . A further problem is then identified and a recommendation given . 
The Law Commission' s proposals are then examined . 
(ii) The Australian approach 
Australia allows disclosure of sources to be ordered where this is "necessary in 
the interests of justice". 193 This principle applies where a plaintiff wishes to sue 
the source directly because an effective remedy is not available against the media 
organisation. 194 An example of where this will arise is when the media 
organisation would have a defence which would not be available to the source. It 
is therefore necessary, in the interests of justice, that a plaintiff is able to sue the 
191 Lange 2000, above n I, para 57. 
192 (1988) 82 ALR 1 (HC) . 
193 John Fairfax and Sons v Cojuangco (1988) 82 ALR L 9 (HC) . 
194 John Fairfax and Sons v Cojuangco (1988) 82 ALR L 9 (HC). 
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t 
1 
source m order to help mend reputational harm. If the plaintiff is denied the 
opportunity to sue the source the plaintiff will be denied a remedy and justice will 
not be done. However, if an effective remedy is available against the media 
organisation then disclosure is not required. This approach is very similar to the 
equitable procedure for discovery of a wrongdoer. 195 
Allowing disclosure of sources in this situation has been shown to have some 
negative effects. In two cases, to ensure that orders for preliminary discovery of 
the identity of sources were set aside, media organisations abandoned defences 
which might otherwise have protected them from liability for defamation. 196 This 
effectively saw the media organisations assume liability in order to protect the 
confidentiality of their sources. This effect could potentially dissuade media 
organisations from guaranteeing confidentiality which will in turn dissuade 
informants from providing information. 
However, having said this, I believe this to be a justified limitation on the 
Newspaper Rule. Sources should be revealed if a plaintiff would otherwise be 
denied an effective remedy. While media organisations may in rare circumstances 
be forced to assume liability in order to protect their sources, this is a cost which 
can be justified by the need to protect reputation. A media organisation will 
simply have to assume the consequences of their decision to guarantee 
confidentiality. 
This is one example where disclosure will be necessary in the interests of justice. 
The more difficult, and important issue, is deciding whether disclosure should be 
required in order to allow the plaintiff to prove irresponsibility. As is explained in 
the following analysis the "necessary in the interests of justice test" is not helpful 
here. 
195 See British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [198 l] AC 1096 (HL) : Norwich 
Phar111acal Co v Customs and Excise Co111111issioners [197-l] AC 133 (HL). See also Sally 
Walker "Compelling Journalists to Identify Their Sources: 'The Newspaper Rule ' and 
'Necessity"' (1991) 14(2). U.N.S.W. Law Journal 303 . 
196 Cojua~1gco v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (No 2) (1991) Aust Torts Rep 81 068 (NSW SC): The 
Herald & /Veek~v Ti111es Ltd v The Guide Dog Owners ' and Friends ' Association ( l 990) VR 451 
(Vic SC). 
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(iii) Should disclosure be required in order to help allow the plaintiff to show 
irresponsibility? 
The introduction of a responsibility standard now means that a defendant's 
sources are more likely to be scrutinised because it is now easier to defeat the new 
privilege. The question that must now be answered is whether, in light of the new 
privilege, it could be necessary, in the interests of justice, to order a defendant to 
reveal sources in order to prove misuse of the occasion of privilege. 
Applying the Australian "necessary in the interests of justice" formulation would 
mean that disclosure would only be required if the claim would otherwise fail 
against the media organisation. In such a situation disclosure would be necessary 
otherwise the plaintiff would be deprived of a remedy. There is, however, one 
glaring problem with this approach, it cannot work in practice. This is because 
the relevance of a defendant ' s sources, in relation to the success or failure of a 
defamation suit, cannot be ascertained until those sources are in fact disclosed . 
The problem is circular, the question of disclosure cannot be answered without 
first disclosing. Disclosure of sources could reveal substantial conduct faults or it 
could reveal no conduct faults . In the latter case a plaintiff would have to rely 
solely on other factors to show irresponsibility/recklessness anyway. 
The "necessary in the interests of justice" test is unhelpful in resolving this issue. 
What then should the significance be of a defendant's decision not to disclose the 
identity of their sources? There is no obvious answer. On the one hand it seems 
absurd to allow a plaintiff the opportunity to defeat qualified privilege by showing 
irresponsibility but then partially negating this opportunity by restricting the means 
to do it. On the other hand, requiring that a media organisation disclose its 
sources, whenever it relied on the new privilege, would undermine the rationale of 
the new privilege and the Newspaper Rule which is to promote free speech . 
Neither of these alternatives is satisfactory. 
The answer to this problem can be found by reference to Lange 2000 . The court 
indicated that a defendant would be wise to point to factors which show they have 
acted responsibly: "If the publisher is unable or unwilling to disclose any 
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responsible basis for a asserting a genuine belief in truth, the jury may well be 
entitled to draw the inference that no such belief existed."197 
If the defendant cannot point to non-confidential source factors which show they 
have acted responsibly then the decision whether or not to maintain confidentiality 
will become critical. If the media organisation decides not to disclose their 
sources, .the jury is "entitled" to deprive them of the defence. However, if the 
media organisation has acted responsibly in relation to its sources then disclosure 
may show them to be responsible. A defendant who cannot show responsibility 
without source disclosure will have to decide whether to burn their sources or run 
the risk of having the privilege defeated Non-disclosure will therefore be one 
factor relevant to deciding whether a media organisation has acted responsibly. 
The decision not to disclose, by itself, will not be enough to defeat the new 
privilege if the defendant can point to other factors which show responsibility. If 
they cannot, the decision to maintain confidentiality could be costly. 
This approach, recommended by Lange 2000, is in my opinion the best way to 
deal with a defendant ' s decision not to disclose their sources. This approach will 
still allow a defendant to uphold confidentiality and will therefore not undermine 
the rationale of the Newspaper Rule which is to promote the free flow of 
information. 198 However, this is counter-balanced in order to provide some 
protection for reputation. The decision not to disclose may be costly for the 
defendant if they cannot point to other areas of responsible conduct or have been 
shown, by the plaintiff, to have acted irresponsibly in relation to other areas of 
conduct. This approach would strike a fair balance between the competing 
interests of the defendant and free speech on the one hand and the plaintiff and 
reputation on the other. 
197 Lange 2000, above nl. para -D . 
198 A lex Harvey. above n 1-l-l, 166 per Woodhouse J, 172 per Richardson J, 180 per McMullin J. 
(iv) The Law Commission 
In its discussion of Lange v Ark;nson the Commission recommended that 
Parliament adopt cl 66 of its draft evidence code. 199 Clause 66 appears to apply 
to the entire litigation process and provides a broad prohibition against compelling 
a journalist to reveal their sources, however the High Court can order 
disclosure:200 
66 Protection of journalists ' sources 
(1) A journalist who has promised an informant not to disclose that informant ' s 
identity and the employer of such a journalist are not , unless an order is made 
under subsection (2) , compellable in a civil or criminal proceeding to answer 
any question or produce any document that the journalist or employer would, 
but for this section. be compellable to answer or produce if that answer or 
production would disclose the identity of the informant or make possible the 
discovery of that identity. 
(2) The High Court may order that subsection (1) is not to apply if a Judge of the 
High Court is satisfied by a party to a civil or criminal proceeding that 
having regard to the issues to be determined in that proceeding, the public 
interest in the disclosure of evidence of the identity of the informant 
outweighs 
(a) any likely adverse effect of such disclosure on the informant or any other 
person: and 
{b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion by the news 
media to the public and the corresponding need of the news media for 
access to the sources of facts. 
Clause 66(3) allows the High Court to impose such terms and conditions on 
disclosure as it thinks fit . This provision, if adopted by Parliament,2°1 would 
provide a broad test that would allow exceptions to the Newspaper Rule and its 
counterparts. Exactly when the public interest in disclosure will be dominant and 
199 "NZLC Final Report·'. above n 8, para 25 ; New Zealand Law Commission Evidence (1999) 
NZLC R 55 Vo! 2, 172. 
:oo Ne\\. Zealand Law Commission Evidence ( 1999) NZLC R 55 Yo! 2. 172 . 
201 It should be noted that Parliament is more likely to intervene here than in relation to 
switching the burden of proof, discussed above- Part TV D l. This is because this provision is 
part of a comprehensive eYidence code which demands greater parliamentary attention than one 
area of defamation law. Howeycr. at the time of writing this paper the draft evidence code was 
not yet on the legislative agenda for Parliament to discuss. 
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require disclosure of sources is unclear. The test does, however, recognise that 
in-roads into the Newspaper Rule can be justified. 
3 Recommendations 
With regard to the pleading problem I submit that , in all situations where 
confidential sources are used, only minimal particulars should be required . 
In relation to the Newspaper Rule, and following the Australian approach, 
disclosure should be ordered where a plaintiff is unable to obtain an effective 
remedy against the media organisation. This is necessary in the interests of 
justice. Where disclosure is ordered a media organisation can avoid this and still 
uphold the confidentiality of their sources by not pleading qualified privilege for 
political discussion. Other situations may require disclosure where necessary in 
the interests of justice. 
Disclosure should not be required simply because a media organisation wishes to 
rely on the Newspaper Rule while pleading qualified privilege for political 
discussion. However, a refusal to disclose is one factor which may help to show 
irresponsibility. This factor is not sufficient on its own and therefore the new 
privilege cannot be defeated where a defendant refuses to disclose but has no 
other conduct faults . The defendant will be under a tactical burden to show that 
they have acted responsibly in other ways if they wish to maintain confidentiality. 
If the Law Commission Evidence Code is adopted then this will provide a broad 
test which can be applied to all situations and will obviously replace the 
"necessary in the interests of justice" test. However, if adopted, the Code should 
still be applied consistently with the above recommendations. 
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V- THE SCOPE OF THE NEW PRIVILEGE 
A Representative and Responsible Government 
Lange 2000 recognises specifically that qualified privilege applies to statements 
about former, current and aspiring parliamentarians. This is an application of the 
more general principle that privilege attaches to statements which directly concern 
the functioning of representative and responsible government. The Court of 
Appeal did not define the scope of this phrase. 
Both logic and foreign jurisprudence suggest that the privilege include statements 
which relate to the executive branch of government. This would include all 
government bodies which maintain and execute the law by way of enforcement 
and administration of public services.
202 In Lange v Australian Broadcashng 
C01poratio1120-' Brennan J speaking for the court stated that: 20-1 
[T]hose provisions which prescribe the system of responsible government 
necessarily imply a limitation on legislatiYe and executive power to deny the 
electors and their representatives information concerning the conduct of the 
executive branch of goyernment ... Moreover. the conduct of the executive branch 
is not confined to ministers and the public service. It includes the affairs of 
statutory authorities and public utilities which arc obliged to report Lo the 
legislature or to a minister who is responsible to the legislature. 
Although this comment was made in light of the Australian constitution, Brennan 
J was discussing general concepts of free speech and "responsible government" . 
205 
It therefore seems clear that the privilege should apply to at least some parts of 
the executive. For example the Police should be included as they exercise 
202 M McDowelL D Webb 771e New Zealand legal Syste111 : Struuures, processes & legal theory 
(1995. Butterworths. Wellington) 10.l . 
:o3 Lange v ABC, aboYe n 38. 
20
·
1 Lange v ABC, aboYe n 38, 116. 
205 Lange v A BC, above n 38. J 16 per Brennan J. 
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important functions daily and wield a huge amount of discretion. 206 The judiciary 
has also been thought to come within the scope of "political discussion". 207 Local 
government authorities, who also exercise parliament delegated discretion, should 
also clearly be subject to the privilege. 208 
It is important to note that the width of dissemination will be relevant when 
considering the general privilege given in Lange 2000. The privilege can apply to 
generally published statements but the "width of the identified public concern 
[ must justify] the extent of publication" . 209 So in the case of local government 
issues it will be necessary to show that general publication is justified. 
B Status Versus Content Based Approaches to Defining Scope- Lessons 
From the United States Experience 
More difficult issues anse when trying to establish how far into government 
agencies the general privilege should go. For example, should the privilege apply 
to all employees of government agencies which fall under the executive branch of 
government? The simple answer would be yes, provided that the statement 
concerned the functioning of representative and responsible government. This 
test is however problematic because it is based on the content of the information 
rather that the status of the individual. 21° For example it is unclear whether 
statements about a public school headmaster, or a case manager for a Work and 
Income New Zealand branch are covered under "representative and responsible 
government". In comparison, the specific test relating to current, former or 
aspiring parliamentarians is far more easy to apply because it is based on status 
which is generally more easy to establish. 
206 Lewandowski v Love// (No 2) (1995) WAR 468, 470 (SC). This case involved allegations 
that certain police officers were trying to pervert the course of justice. This was held to be 
"political discussion". 
'.!Oi Lewandowski v Love// (No 2) (1995) WAR 468, 470 (SC). 
208 Lange v ABC, above n 38, 116. 
209 Lange 2000, above n 1, para 10. 
210 Any status based test will always have a content element to limit it. For example while the 
specific Lange 2000 privilege relating to parliamentarians is based on status it is limited to 
statements which effect their capacity to meet their public responsibilities. 
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United States jurisprudence is useful to illustrate why a status-based approach 
should be favoured to a content-based approach. The Supreme Court recognised 
the importance of political discussion over 35 years ago. It held that privilege 
applied to criticisms of public officials. 
2 11 The privilege was soon after extended 
to include public figures. 2 12 The privilege was at this stage based on the status of 
the individual. However, in Rosenbloom v Metromedia Inc
213 (Rosembloom) the 
Supreme Court decided to adopt a content-based approach allowing privilege to 
apply to statements of "public or general concern" .
214 Only three years later the 
Supreme Court overruled Rosembloom abandoning the content-based approach . 
Its reason for doing so was because of the inherent difficulties in establishing 
"which publications address issues of ' general or public interest ' and which do 
not". 2 15 The content-based test had proven too difficult for courts to manage. It 
must, however, be noted that the status-based approach is not without grey areas. 
For example difficulties arise in the United States in relation to deciding exactly 
when someone has become a public figure or has stopped being a public figure .
2 16 
While problems exist, in my opinion they are smaller under a status-based 
approach. 
New Zealand courts will have enormous problems in trying to establish exactly 
what relates to the functioning of representative and responsible government. 
Perhaps a workable test that could be used in interpreting this term would be to 
allow the privilege to apply to those who have responsibility for exercising 
discretion in administering governmental functions .
2 17 Such an approach would 
be desirable for two reasons . Firstly, it could be more easily applied as it is a 
status-based approach. It would not be overly difficult for a court to establish 
whether the plaintiff's duties involve exercising administrative discretion or 
21 1 See New York Times Ltd v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254 . 
::
12 See Curlis Publishing Co v Butts (1967) 388 US 130. 
213 (1971 ) 403 us 29. 
214 Rosemb/00111 v J\!etromedia Inc. (1971) 403 US 29, 52 per Burger J. 
215 Gertz v Robert Welch Inc. (1974) 418 US 323, 346. 
216 See D Walton "The Public Figure Doctrine: A Re-examination of Gertz v Robert Welch Inc. 
in Light of Lower Federal Court Public Figure Formulations" 16 N Ill UL Rev 141, 156. 
217 See J Schaffner "Protection of Reputation Versus Freedom of Expression : Striking a 
Manageable Compromise in the Tort of Defamation" (l 990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. -l35, 458 . 
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whether they merely carry out prescribed administrative duties . Secondly, 
because it would cover those who have the power to affect the public it would fall 
within the Court of Appeal's broad test of statements which concern the 
functioning of representative and responsible government. While there will 
always be grey areas, this approach would, in my opinion, be helpful in 
establishing the scope of the new privilege. 
C Political Speech Versus Other Speech 
Lange 2000 has increased the protection for one category of free speech. Such an 
approach to human rights law has received criticism:
218 
[A] test expressed in terms of a category of cases. such as political speech. is at 
variance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which in 
cases of competing rights and interests requires a balancing exercise in the light 
of the concrete facts of each case. 
This argument recognises the dynamic nature of human rights and the need to 
assess their application according to individual fact scenarios. While political 
discussion is fundamental to any democracy, it must be questioned whether it is 
justifiable to broadly distinguish political discussion from discussion of other 
matters of serious public concern.
2 19 There are individuals and organisations in 
New Zealand that fall outside the scope of the political discussion test but still 
have the ability to greatly affect the public. The following example illustrates the 
sorts of anomalies that can arise where types of free speech are categorised . Take 
on the one hand a list candidate for the Green Party who is accused of embezzling 
party funds . Such a case is considered important enough so as to automatically 
attract qualified privilege for political discussion . Now imagine a newspaper is 
informed by a reliable source that there is price collusion between oil companies in 
218 Reynolds HL , above n 9, 631 per Lord Steyn. It should also be noted that the European . ' 
Court of Human Rights has indicated that free speech as a whole should be given special 
protection. see Lingens v Austria ( 1986) 8 EHRR -+07 (E Cl. HR) 
219 Reynolds ffl. above n 9, 625 per Lord Nicholls. 631 per Lord Steyn, 6-W per Lord Cooke. 
6-l9-650 per Lord Hope. 
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New Zealand. The public interest in the information contained in the second 
example is clearly as great, if not greater, than the public interest in the 
information in the first example. However, the dissemination of the information 
regarding the oil companies receives less free speech protection. While the later 
case might still receive protection from the common law duty/interest test, 
220 it is 
hard to justify the difference. Free speech is a dynamic concept that can only be 
dealt with on a case by case basis. 
D Other Issues Relating to Scope- A Plethora of Questions 
While Lange 2000 established a new form of qualified privilege, many issues now 
surround the existing common law duty/interest test . Reynolds has advanced the 
common law test by recognising that "court[s] should be slow to conclude that a 
publication is not in the public interest. .. ".
221 Furthermore, Lord Nicholls has 
provided a list of factors which should be referred to in deciding whether the 
duty/interest test is satisfied . These factors were not part of the pre-Reynolds law 
and it must be decided whether New Zealand embraces all of these factors in 
deciding whether privilege applies to non-political discussion. Arguably, due to 
Lange 2000, New Zealand courts should ignore any factor that relates to misuse 
of the occasion of privilege when assessing privilege. This is because the 
Reynolds formulation mixes the occasion of privilege with misuse of that 
occasion, an approach firmly rejected in Lange 2000.
222 
This raises another interesting issue relating to misuse of the occasion of privilege. 
The Court of Appeal left unclear whether the "responsibility" standard applies to 
all types of speech. The answer here is arguably no. This is because the extension 
to section 19 was aimed at counter-balancing the increase in free speech 
recognition given by the new privilege. There was no increase in free speech 
recognition given to non-political speech and therefore it cannot have been 
""
0 It should be noted that the dissemination of the information regarding the oil companies 
could receive protection under Reynolds if that decision was upheld in New Zealand. This is, 
however, unlikely in my opinion and is more fully discussed below in Part VD. 
'.!'.!J Reynolds HL. above n 9. 626 per Lord Nicholls. 
'.!Z'.! Lange 2000, above n 1, paras 5-6 . 
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intended that the extension of section 19 apply to non-political speech. This 
analysis suggests that Reynolds has no application in New Zealand and that 
therefore non-political speech will have to remain under the pre-Reynold<; 
duty/interest test. Applying Reynolds to non-political speech would be 
inconsistent with the Court of Appeal ' s emphasis on keeping the occasion of 
privilege separate from the misuse of that occasion. 
VI- CONCLUSION 
Lange 2000 is, overall , a great improvement on Lange 1998 in terms of balancing 
the competing interests of freedom of expression and protection of reputation. 
However, in my opinion, there are unsettled issues in relation to the burden of 
proof and until they are resolved reputation will not be adequately protected . 
This paper has attempted to make recommendations to help solve those issues. 
The Court of Appeal has answered the question of whether political speech 
should receive added protection, but has raised many other questions in doing so . 
Overall, it seems unsatisfactory that the Court has taken this approach . Leaving 
so many unresolved issues hardly promotes the prompt commencement and 
disposal of defamation claims, a recognised aim of the Defamation Act . Perhaps 
it would have been easier, and cheaper, to follow Reynolds. That is not to say 
that Reynolds is the perfect approach. However, many of the issues raised in this 
paper could have been avoided if this approach was taken. For example Reynolds 
does not categorise types of free speech and will therefore not encounter the sorts 
of problems outlined in Part V C. 
There is, however, no point 111 crymg over spilt milk . Lawyers, courts and 
commentators will have to focus on the live issues. For example it must be 
decided whether the extension to section 19 of the Defamation Act applies to all 
occasions of qualified privilege, I believe it should not (see above Part VD) . Also 
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journalists will have to be especially wary of their conduct if they want to use the 
new privilege. More importantly, the boundaries of the new privilege will require 
further attention. As illustrated in Part V A, the phrase "representative and 
responsible government" is very broad . Exactly how widely the phrase will be 
interpreted is unclear. Lange 2000 heralds a new era for defamation law in New 
Zealand. Lange 2000 has given lower courts the green light to rapidly apply 
qualified privilege in many situations that would not be recognised by the pre-
Lange law. 
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Appendix, 1- The Allegedly Defamatory Column 
Po ·ncs By Joe Atkinson 
Getting What You 
Order 
FORMER LEADERS HAVE a bad habic of 
hanging around co make a nuisance of 
themselves. Sir Roberc M uldoon did ic co 
both Jim Mclay and Jim Bolger, hounding 
the former ouc of policies and causing a suc-
cession of difficulties for the laccer. Bue with 
the rise of political commenca.ry and the 
commercial speaker's circuit giving plat-
forms and financial incentives to the 
deposed, this perennial problem is geccing 
worse. Hden Clark is currently =iled by 
no less than three former leaders. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer doc:sn · c mean to 
cause trouble, but he is regularly in the 
public spoclighc, which makes him a for-
midable presence to be acknowledged. 
Mike Moore has done his very best to 
cause crouble buc is scill dithering abouc 
how co administer the mosc celling blow. 
So the immediate problem for Clark is her 
old friend David Lange. who has l:icely 
taken co pronouncing cendenciously on any stay puc. rather cha
n one who gallivants all 
number of issues: New Zealand troopc.'\over the counrry -
as if he 'd alwavs been 
deplovmencs in Bosn ia. the ideolo!,.ricai&there when thev n
eeded him l 
characcer of the pa rliamc:ncary Labour Cartoomsc T
om Scott caughc the 
Pa.rcy. the selecaon ofhis successor in Man- shameless casuisrry
 in one ofLange 's com-
gere. che New Zealand response co French ments last year wh
en he picrured che for-
nuclear cescing. and so on. mer PM lying in a
 hospital bed flanked by 
Former leaders are often anxious co cwo doctors m whice
 coats. The doccors 
make out chat chey could do the job beccer look incentlv ac ch
e patient. shaking their 
than their successo rs. David Lanl!e is no@h~ads.as one savs c
o the other. "Worse case. 
exceotion here . buc his willingness co re- ot false-mc:morv w
ndrome f' ve ever seen.·· 
Lawyers make a disrinccion between 
admired colleagues who have mastered dif-
ficult areas of law and courrroom accors 
who know less law buc are lighcning quJCk 
on their fc:ec. Da,,,;d Lange was one of the 
laccer. His speciality was che plea in miaga-
cion for guilty but indigent clients. Pickmg 
up legal aid briets shorcly before his clients 
were due in courc. he improvised defences 
against poor odds, and when the inevitable 
verdict was handed down he did a brilliant 
~ write hiscorv m doino- so is reminiscent of j ob of explaini
ng whv the normal penalc.-
_,, Darnel Defoe. WITH HIS IMPR
ESSIVE physical presence. ought to be reduced. 
Lmge talks now as thouc:h he scood prodigious brain and e::
---rraordinary verbal He was a superb legal aid bam scer. 
alone a!?:linsc Roger Douglas, whc:n m face dexcericy . Lange 
possesses man y of che/CI\ morallv corrurucced to his hapless cl
ients 
Cl) his accack of social conscience was a bebcecj acrribuces of greamess. His command of che\JJ buc bv all accounts less than fullv comm
H:-
..2.!l..~- He calks as chough he invented Ne~ rhecoric of moral o
ucrage in his Oxford ted co che profemon he pracnsed. And
 as 
/TI Zealand's anti-nuclear policv. when in Union debace 
W1th the Reverend Jerry Fal- with his teachers. there was the b
arest hint 
\2) cruth his conversion was somewhat reluc-. well deservedly w
on him (and New of disdain in his manner, as if concedi
ng 
S!ill:. He calks as though he acrually deserves Zealand) global plaud
its. buc the finish has more than minor etforr on his parr mig
ht 
the media-awarded mantle of international not been worthy 
of the scare. Perhaps it reduce him co their level. 
statesmanship , when in fact he handled the never is. buc with
 Lange che gap becweenfio\ Lange carried this dileccanrish guis
e into 
iss_ue of nuclear-ship visits with che finesse@promise and perf
ormance is wider than_Yhe poliacal arena. His rise was met
eonc. 
or a skateboarding hippo. usual. 
but his appeace for che baccle wa., alwavs 
Having himself showbo:iced wich the It has ;µways be
en so apparentl y. slightly suspecc. le is hard co say how muc
h 
French over the Rainbow Wamor :ind being Nobodv f've spok
en co who knew Lange his health problems had co do with
 chis. 
fo rced to back down o ver impnso nment of(j)at schoo l o r um v
ers1rv reckons that he though whc:n standing down as prime m
in-
che conv1cced agencs. he now has the worked p:imcularl
v hard in those davs. His iscer on August 7 J 989 he assured the pre
ss 
effrontery to cricicise others for grand- brilliance is freely a
cknowledged, buc with char poor health was noc a conclusive
 fac-
sonding on Moruroa . His charge chat the the common cave
:ic that ic was flash y and tor in his decmon. 
parliamentary Labour Parry is more con- j ust slightly oversol
d. A more inappropriate A rerrospc:ccive look at a cranscn
pt of 
servat1vt' now than ic was under his own minister of educa
t1on would be hard to thac final pres.s conference makes int
erest-
leadership 1s breathtaking m its audac1ty-(5)tind. for he appeare
d co dc:sp1se his teachers_ ing reading, for some of his answc:rs a
rc a 
Similarly. m rrymg co appoinc his own sue- and thev sometime
s resented him. thmkmg lot funnier now than he could pos
sihlv 
Cesso r m Man!!;ere. ht' cheekd v rng!!;ests ht" was11·c at schoo
l m learn . i, uc to , how have.: mcended them to he Jt the nmc.:
. 
chat thl' ekctor~ce need, Jn M [>. wh~, will o ff 
When asked . for instance. wh:H he· 
w:um:d to Jo .is .1 backbc.:nchc.:r. L.m!,.;e 
respondc.:d facc.:twuslv: ··w di. l won ·c be :i 
politic;il c:olummsc. ·· He.: w:1s .dso .1skc.:d 
wh:1t he would 111iss most in his old job. 
@ .md h': 111:1Je chrc.:e c.:v:isive replies. c.:-.1ch 
one.: nt them in1dvertenclv rc.:vc.:al1m;;. 
1111ss .. md there.:\ lots nt chin~ -th:it you· re 
,!;l:iJ you diJ •. mJ lots of chins;; you don ·c 
ti.:c.:I like.:.·· ""Like what? .. m111c.:011c.: 111sistc.:J. 
The tinal reply was vint1gc: L.ingc:: "[ Jon·c 
know whether you·vc: c.:ver crieJ co orJer 
bn::ikfast in :i New Zc:::tl:ind hoed ... he s1id. 
ti.:rc:nces. public penormmces. rhecoriCl] 
pvrocechnics. I_c was the nittv-gritty otpol-
1ocs hc.: coulJn c scad. the endlc:ss facl!-to-
facc: wnngles .ind policy consultaciom 
w1th people: he: thought boring or worse:. 
Thc:: tir.;c ching he said hc:: · d n11ss was ··but l h:ivc.: yet co gee one ch:ic l ordc:rc.:d... 
HE s Aw THE EN o s of policies so clc::ir!y 
··press conterc:m:c:s ... Evc::ryboJv bughed. Ag:iin the bughcc:r ro:irc:d forth. Jdlc::ccing
, buc he couldn ' t sic scill long enough co •rei 
buc nc::vc::r was a m1er word spokc.:n in jc::sc. as it was mc::mc co. the chance: of sdf-n:v
- :ihrrc.:c:mc::nc on policy dc:cils. That m~t 
L:ingc: had m0rc: nbvious er~chus1:ism tor ebaon. L.1ngc: h:id won .1nocher round. 
luve been part of his problem with Roget 
pnme ministerial press conterc::nCL"S ch:111 AnJ vc:c m :i sense he: h:id :ilso lost th
e Douglas. It was a job he: preferred to lc::1ve 
for 1ny other aspect of his job~ Hc:: rdishc::J battle. tor wh:1~ hc:: hid from his audience
,@co others. 1nd vet it was 1 job chac. ai 
the concc.:st bec:iuse hc:: won it easily . H1@pc::rh:1ps _evc.:n trom h1msdf. were: h1~ rc.::1l~lc:
::idc:r. he: had co do hirnsdf or it wouldn'i 
nunders .1dv1sed !um co cut off" rc:porcc.:rs rc.::L~ons tor le:ivmg: chc:: truth was. he: toun
d be: etfc:cavdv done:. 
4uescions :iti:er iS m.inucc::s maximum. but the: 10b coo much like hard work. It w1~
- le must g:ill D::ivld Lange chat several ol 
L:inge w_ould amble out under chc:: cdevi- n"cjusc chc: hoed brc:akfuts Lange: loathed
. chose: others, chose: inferior mechanic! 
sion lights. with chc::sc putfed out :ind h::inds but m:my other things ::ibouc the role .
IS (Clark. Cullen :ind Caygill 1mong chem) 
pushed down :it his sides. like: .1 boxc.:r well. One of the crucial things he: "didn"
c arc: now running the Labour P::irty :me 
c::iuncing his opponent co cake a shoe :ic fi:d like:" as prime minister. for instance. do
ing :i vascly bettc.:r job of ic chm he w :i: 
him. As che indTc::ccual queries pdced was going co meetings, including c::ibine
c c.:ver capable of doing. 
down on him - sddom getting close:. meetings which he h.abicw.lly leti: eiriy. 
That muse be why he so ofi:en puts therr 
nc.:vc.:r hurting - the big man Juckc.:d ::ind For whatever rc.::ison - :in0n:i pains
. down. For if the: fourth Labour govern-
wc.:::ivc:d with obvious h'1..ISCO. dnwing out boredom or some inner demon - he
: mc.:nc under his lc::adership had been savinr 
the bout for :20 rninucc.:s . 40 minutes . tound it hard co sic scill :ind oti:c.:n rume~ :in
d doing what it is now saying ::ind d~ing 
so mc.:cimes longer. His scff cou!Jn 'c gc.:t 0 ver 
the: c::ibmet chair co Gc:otfrc:v tJ:tlmc.:~ it would surdy not have been so thor-
ium co scop . ll:t/-vhilc.: he: .unbleJ otf co che coi!c.:t. co !u
s oughlv cliscrc.:ditc.:d ::imong its foUowecs. 
l3uc .ic che l'JH<J prc.:ss conterc.:nce. chc.: o ffice:. o r c:vc:n co che sdf-Jrivc: c::ir which_ 
She: m:iy not h::ivc: L.1nge 's wic o 
Journalises pressed him .1hr:un for :1 saasb.c- he likc.:d co cikc.: out tor ::i rc:crc::aao11:tl spm
_ gt:nius. nor his t:ffortlc:ss co!TlilUild of th, 
cory .iruwer. Ap:in: from chc:: press. whac on the Wc.:llim.,'ton mocorw::iv. Wht:n hi
s popuhr mc.:dia. but Hden Clark is vastl~ 
dsc:: would he nuss? L.1ngc: now bec::imc: sutf rc.:sponded by havlng :i c::ir phone: tic
- superior co him :is .1 policy-m:ikc.:r :m< 
(:-:n more: obvlouslv _c.:vasivc:. rdem~g to .~m- c.:d. he: cook it otf the: hook. He has nevc.:r pirty man::igc
::r. l'U bee she: also has no rrou-
~ sc.:lf in che ch1rd perso n . · Oh. he: re::i.lly grown up . ble getting chc.: break.fasts she orders u 
rc::spondt:d ... there: :ire: lots of things you 13uc he: got ::i re:tl kick ouc of press con
- Nt:w Zc.::tl:ind hocds. 
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Appendix 2- Codes of Ethics 
A Press Council Principles 
Accuracy 
1. Publications (newspapers and magazines) should be guided at all times by 
accuracy, fairness and balance, and should not deliberately mislead or misinform 
readers by commission, or omission . 
Corrections 
2. Where it is established that there has been published information that is 
materially incorrect then the publication should promptly correct the error giving 
the correction fair prominence. In appropriate circumstances the correction may 
be accompanied by an apology and a right of reply by an affected person or 
persons. 
Privacy 
3. Everyone is entitled to privacy of person, space and personal information, and 
these rights should be respected by publications. Nevertheless the right of privacy 
should not interfere with publication of matters of public record, or obvious 
significant public interest . 
Publications should exercise care and discretion before identifying relatives of 
persons convicted or accused of crime where the reference to them is not directly 
relevant to the matter reported. 
Those suffering from trauma or grief call for special consideration, and when 
approached, or enquiries are being undertaken, careful attention is to be given to 
their sensibilities. 
Confidentiality 
4. Editors have a strong obligation to protect against disclosure the identity of 
confidential sources. They also have a duty to take reasonable steps to satisfy 
themselves that such sources are well informed and that the information they 
provide is reliable. 
Children and Young People 
5. Editors should have particular care and consideration for reporting on and 
about children and young people. 
Comment and Fact 
6. Publications should, as far as possible, make proper distinctions between 
reporting facts and conjecture, passing of opinions and comment. 
Advocacy 
7. A publication is entitled to adopt a forthright stance and advocate a position of 
any issue. 
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Discrimination 
8. Publications should not place gratuitous emphasis on gender, religion, minority 
groups, sexual orientation, race, colour or physical or mental disability unless the 
description is off public interest. 
Subterfuge 
9. Editors should generally not sanction misrepresentations, deceit or subterfuge 
to obtain information for publication unless there is a clear case of public interest 
and the information cannot be obtained in any other way. 
Headlines and Captions 
10. Headlines, sub-headings, and captions should accurately and fairly convey the 
substance of the report they are designed to cover. 
Photographs 
11 . Editors should take care in photographic and image selection and treatment. 
They should not publish photographs or images which have been manipulated 
without informing readers of the fact and, where significant, the nature and 
purpose of the manipulation. Those involving situations of grief and shock are to 
be handled with special consideration for the sensibilities of those affected . 
Letters 
12. Selection and treatment of letters for publication are the prerogative of editors 
who are to be guided by fairness, balance, and public interest in the 
correspondents ' views. 
Council Adjudications 
13 . Editors and obliged to publish the substance of Council adjudications that 
uphold a complaint. 
B Independent News Limited (INL) Code of Ethics 
INL publications, editors and editorial staff will strive to be: 
• accurate 
• fair 
• independent 
In pursuit of these goals, they will : 
1. Present news and comment honestly, bearing in mind the pnvacy and 
sensibilities of individuals as well as the public interest. 
2. Correct mistakes by prompt correction and explanation and, where necessary, 
apology. 
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3. Ensure journalists and photographers identify themselves and their purpose 
clearly and not misrepresent themselves unless there is a case of compelling public 
interest and the information cannot by obtained in any other way. 
4. Approach cases involving personal grief or shock with sympathy and discretion. 
5. Ensure that staff act professionally so as not to compromise the integrity or 
reputation of themselves or their publication. 
6. Value originality in journalism, and take every reasonable precaution to avoid 
plagiarism. 
7. Not allow the personal interests of journalists to influence them m their 
professional duties. 
8. Not allow the professional duties of journalists to be influenced by any 
consideration, gift or advantage offered and, where appropriate, disclose any such 
offer. 
9. Not tamper with photographs to distort and/or misrepresent the image without 
informing the reader what has occurred and why. 
10. Protect confidential sources. 
11 . Avoid stereotyping by race, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
physical appearance or social status, without avoiding legitimate public debate on 
such issues in the public interest. 
12. Publish any Press Council decisions involving their publications as soon as 
practicable. 
C New Zealand Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union-
Journalists ' Code of Ethics 
Respect for truth and the public' s right to information are over-riding principles 
for all journalists. In pursuance of these principles, journalists commit themselves 
to ethical and professional standards. All members of the Union engaged in 
gathering, transmitting, disseminating and commenting on news and information 
shall observe the following Code of Ethics in their professional activities : 
(a) They shall report and interpret news with scrupulous honesty and striving to 
disclose all essential facts and by not suppressing relevant, available facts or 
distorting by wrong or improper analysis. 
(b) They shall not place unnecessary emphasis on gender, race, sexual preference, 
religious belief, marital status or physical or mental di sability. 
( c) In all circumstances they shall respect all confidences received in the course of 
their occupation. 
( d) They shall not allow personal interests to influence them in their professional 
duties. 
( e) They shall not allow their professional duties to be influenced by 
consideration, gift or advantage offered and, where appropriate, shall disclose any 
such offer. 
(f) They shall not allow advertising or commercial considerations to influence 
them in their professional duties. 
(g) They shall use fair and honest means to obtain news, pictures, films, tapes and 
documents . 
(h) They shall identify themselves and their employers before obtaining any 
interview for publication or broadcast. 
(i) They shall respect private grief and personal privacy and shall have the right to 
resist compulsion to intrude on them. 
G) They shall do their utmost to correct any published or broadcast information 
found to be harmfully inaccurate. 
D Broadcasting Standards Authority- Free-To-Air Television 
Programme Code: General Programme Standards 
(Selected standards only) 
All Programmes (including promos) 
In the preparation and presentation of programmes, broadcasters are required: 
Gl. To be truthful and accurate on points of fact. 
G2. To take into consideration currently accepted norms of decency and taste in 
language and behaviour, bearing in mind the context in which any language or 
behaviour occurs. 
G3 . To acknowledge the right of individuals to express their own opinions. 
G4 . To deal justly and fairly with any person taking part or referred to in any 
programme. 
GS . To respect the principles of law which sustain our society. 
67 
G6. To show balance, impartiality and fairness in dealing with political matters, 
current affairs and all questions of a controversial nature. 
G7. To avoid the use of any deceptive programme practice in the presentation of 
programmes which takes advantage of the confidence viewers have in the integrity 
of broadcasting. 
G 13 . To avoid portraying people in a way which represents as inherently inferior, 
or is likely to encourage discrimination against, any section of the community on 
account of sex, race, age, disability, occupational status, sexual orientation or the 
holding of any religious, cultural or political belief This requirement is not 
intended to prevent the broadcast of material which is : 
i) factual , or 
ii) the expression of genuinely-held opinion in a news or current affairs 
programme, or 
iii) in the legitimate context of humorous, satirical or dramatic work. 
News Current Affairs and Documentaries 
G14. News must be presented accurately, objectively and impartially. 
G 15 . The standards of integrity and reliability of information sources m news, 
current affairs and documentaries should be monitored regularly . 
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